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Optimal Deterrence and the Preference Gap 
Brook Gotberg* 
It is generally understood that the way to discourage particular 
behavior in individuals is to punish that behavior, on the theory that 
rational individuals seek to avoid punishment. Laws aimed at deterring 
behavior operate on the assumption that increasing the likelihood of 
punishment, the severity of punishment, or both, will decrease the 
behavior. The success of these laws is evaluated by how much the targeted 
behavior decreases. The law of preferential transfers—which punishes 
creditors who have been paid prior to a bankruptcy filing at the expense of 
other, unpaid creditors—has been defended on the grounds that it deters a 
race to collect from a struggling debtor. However, deterrence theory 
suggests that the low likelihood of punishment and the cap on punishment 
associated with preference law make it a very poor deterrence. Further, 
empirical evidence drawn from interviews with affected creditors, debtors, 
and attorneys demonstrates that in practice preference law does little or 
nothing to deter targeted behavior and, in the process, imposes significant 
costs. The weaknesses of preference law call for its significant revision, to 
place a greater focus on specific categories of creditors to be punished on 
account of their pre-bankruptcy activities. 
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Southworth (‘19), for their tireless efforts searching court records and transcribing 
interviews. Special thanks also to Andrew Dawson, Dennis Crouch, Christopher Bradley, 
Lindsey Simon, and the attendees of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools, as well as 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Laws that are internally inconsistent in their purpose, their 
application, and their consequences are inevitably (and accurately) 
perceived to be unfair by those whom they regulate. So it is with 
the law of preferential transfers in bankruptcy, which can 
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negatively affect those who have done business with a debtor and 
find themselves involved in bankruptcy proceedings as a con-
sequence of the debtor’s bankruptcy petition. In any given year, 
thousands of creditors who have been paid on account of 
outstanding debts owed by the debtor, or who have otherwise 
improved their position vis-à-vis the debtor in the ninety days prior 
to the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, are subject to laws mandating 
the return of those funds to the bankruptcy estate. Although this 
result is always unpleasant and unwelcome for the liable creditors, 
it has been justified on two general grounds. First, the mandate of 
equality in bankruptcy suggests that all unsecured creditors, 
including those who might have been paid in the ninety-day run 
up to bankruptcy, should share equally in the pain of discharge by 
participating in a pro rata distribution of the debtor’s available 
assets.1 Second, creditors should be deterred from attempting to 
recover from debtors who are insolvent, thereby hastening the 
decline into bankruptcy and causing a loss of the debtor’s value as 
a going concern. Under this second rationale, some transfers, 
particularly those that reflect ongoing business transactions with 
the debtor, should be protected from preference law, even if doing 
so undermines the first rationale of equality. 
These two explanations for preference law are internally 
inconsistent, as the first supports the return of all preferential 
transfers, while the second would differentiate between “good” 
and “bad” transfers. I have argued elsewhere that, at least in the 
context of business bankruptcies, Chapter 7 liquidation and 
Chapter 11 reorganization should be treated differently for 
purposes of preference law. Preference law should be enforced 
more stringently in Chapter 7 liquidation to better serve the goal of 
equal distribution, and abandoned in Chapter 11 reorganizations, 
where equal distribution is much less emphasized.2 I have argued 
 
 1. Secured creditors generally have their rights to repayment and satisfaction 
through collateral preserved in bankruptcy, with some exceptions. See Lawrence 
Ponoroff, Reclaim This! Getting Credit Seller Rights in Bankruptcy Right, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 733, 
750–52 (2014). 
 2. See Brook E. Gotberg, Conflicting Preferences in Business Bankruptcy: The Need for 
Different Rules in Different Chapters, 100 IOWA L. REV. 51, 59 (2014). This effort to distinguish 
between bankruptcy chapters has received criticism both from those who argue that it goes 
too far, see Lawrence Ponoroff, Bankruptcy Preferences: Recalcitrant Passengers Aboard the Flight 
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that preference law is about equality: exceptions to the law 
purporting to protect “good” transfers undermine efforts to obtain 
such equality by imposing unnecessary costs on the system.3 Here, 
I respond to critics who have asserted that preference law remains 
essential to deterring undesirable creditor behavior in the days 
leading up to bankruptcy. 
As an initial matter, the concept that law successfully shapes 
behavior through the principle of deterrence is problematic because 
deterrence assumes that actors will act rationally, and we know that 
most will not, at least not all the time.4 Further, it is unclear that the 
behavior targeted by preference law is actually problematic enough 
to be discouraged. Why not allow creditors to collect on their debts, 
particularly when doing so is in those creditors’ own self-interest 
and entirely legal at the time of collection? Notwithstanding these 
criticisms, and assuming both that deterrence can actually work 
and is a worthy goal, I nevertheless conclude that if preference law 
as currently written fails to truly achieve equal distribution, it is a 
much bigger failure in deterring bad creditor behavior. 
Preference law is flawed as a deterrent for two reasons. First, it 
is not at all clear what behavior it attempts to discourage. Indeed, 
different versions of the law have appeared to target dramatically 
different behaviors over time, and commentators are divided as to 
the population of creditors or the types of behavior that should be 
targeted. Second, the law is not an effective deterrence to any 
population or debt collection efforts. The maximum penalty of a 
preference is the return of the amount recovered, with most cases 
settling for a much lower amount. The likelihood of being caught 
by preference law is also highly uncertain; in fact, most creditors 
who seek to recover from struggling debtors will never be subject 
to preference avoidance. 
 
from Creditor Equality, 90 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329, 384 (2016) (“[T]he call for total elimination of 
preferences in reorganization cases is much like killing the patient in order to halt the spread 
of the disease.”), and those who argue it does not go far enough, see David A. Skeel, Jr., The 
Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 729 (2018) (arguing that the 
equality of creditors norm has largely faded from bankruptcy, and that preference law 
should reflect this trend by transitioning to a more limited law targeting self-dealing 
behavior). Such criticisms raise valid concerns regarding complications regarding 
conversion of a case from one chapter to another; unfortunately there is not space to address 
these concerns in this Article. 
 3. See Gotberg, supra note 2. 
 4. Owen D. Jones, The Evolution of Irrationality, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 289, 314–15 (2001). 
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As a consequence of these flaws, preference law is rightly 
viewed as capricious and ineffective. Further, preference law 
disproportionately imposes its costs on less sophisticated or less 
aware creditors, frequently smaller businesses who have naively 
accepted payments from a debtor without any appreciation for 
their potential future liability. These creditors are typically not 
familiar with preference law and cannot be deterred by a law of 
which they are unaware. Better-informed creditors who are 
familiar with preference law are typically also familiar with its 
exceptions, and more likely to structure their transactions to fall 
within an exception. Well-advised creditors can also position 
themselves to challenge a claim of preference liability should it 
arise, dramatically reducing their ultimate liability. To the extent 
informed creditors change their behavior in response to preference 
law, it is not in a way that benefits debtors; that is, rather than 
affording debtors additional breathing space in times of financial 
distress, they reduce the credit they offer to all debtors or insist that 
such credit be secured.5 Due to the inherent caps on preference 
liability, even creditors who fail to raise any colorable defense to 
preference litigation and are found liable are usually better off 
having attempted to collect a preference than not. 
These criticisms of preference law are established and 
demonstrated below6 both by a rational cost-benefit analysis of 
preference collection, drawing upon prior literature regarding 
deterrence in the law, and from empirical field work. This Article is 
the first of its kind to argue that preference law is ineffective as a 
deterrent of collection behavior based on empirical evidence, 
drawn from interviews of actors within the field—debtors, 
creditors, and the attorneys who represented them in bankruptcy 
proceedings. This Article reports on interviews of sampled 
 
 5. For more on how preference law impacts business relationships between debtors 
and creditors, see Brook E. Gotberg, It Cuts Both Ways: How Preference Avoidance Actions Can 
Harm Business Relationships Between Debtors and Creditors 1 (Univ. Mo. Sch. Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 2018-28, 2018), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=3224683. 
 6. For a discussion of the rational cost-benefit analysis, see infra Section II.A, and for 
the empirical findings, see infra Section V.D. 
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individuals who participated in successful7 Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation cases involving preference actions. The overwhelming and 
indisputable conclusion from these interviews is that creditors may 
adjust their behavior in response to preference law, but not in ways 
that further the purported goal of preference deterrence. Accord-
ingly, if preference law is a law of deterrence, it is wholly ineffectual 
in its purpose. 
From this point forth, this Article assumes that preference law 
is not aimed at equality among creditors8 but rather at deterrence.9 
Assuming both that deterrence can work and that we should have 
laws deterring collection,10 preference law would need to be 
substantially altered to successfully deter. Rather than a blanket 
imposition of liability on all creditors who have received payments 
within the ninety days before bankruptcy, liability should be 
limited to insiders, select secured creditors, and judgment lien 
creditors. Rather than demanding mere repayment of the prefer-
ence received, the law should introduce a meaningful penalty to 
discourage these creditors from acting to undermine a debtor’s 
potential for reorganization in the days prior to bankruptcy. 
Stereotypical unsecured creditors do not have the power to 
negatively impact a debtor’s chances of reorganization in a 
meaningful way, and so should not be targets of the law for the sake 
of deterrence. Further, the current scheme does not deter them from 
attempting to recover whatever they can in the days prior to bank-
ruptcy. Accordingly, for purposes of deterrence the law should 
cease to apply to such creditors. 
The Article will proceed as follows. Part II clarifies what it 
means for a law to act as a deterrent, demonstrating how deterrence 
works in criminal and in civil proceedings, and provides a brief 
 
 7. As in many analyses of Chapter 11 cases, success here is defined as obtaining a 
confirmed plan in Chapter 11. See Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success 
of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 610–12 (2009). 
 8. Equality of distribution has long been considered the central goal of bankruptcy, 
although its primacy has recently come under attack. See Skeel, supra note 2. 
 9. I do not advocate this position but rather stand by the perspective I outlined in 
Gotberg, supra note 2. This Article is intended largely to demonstrate the flaws inherent in 
treating preference law as a law of deterrence, rather than equality. Insofar as the law 
continues to satisfy both goals, the recommendations found herein are inconsistent with the 
goal of equality. 
 10. I make these assumptions purely for the sake of argument. I have reservations 
regarding the first assumption and am wholly unpersuaded of the second. 
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summary of how the theory of deterrence has been criticized. Part 
III explains preference law in the bankruptcy context and how it 
can be said to deter creditors. Part IV demonstrates how preference 
law fails to successfully identify targeted behavior. Part V uses a 
cost-benefit model to demonstrate how preference law fails to 
meaningfully deter, because the likelihood of liability is low and 
the penalty associated with a preference is limited to the amount of 
the original transfer. This Part is further supported by empirical 
findings that reinforce the theoretical conclusions of the cost-benefit 
model. Part VI proposes amendments to the preference laws that 
would respond to these findings. It suggests ways in which the law 
could more closely target specific behaviors, while largely 
reserving judgment on whether such behaviors should be targeted 
at all. Part VII concludes. 
II. DETERRENCE 
A. What Does It Mean to Deter? 
A major tool of the law in shaping the behavior of its citizens is 
discouraging certain behavior by penalizing it. The principle of 
legal deterrence operates on the assumption that rational actors will 
examine the costs and benefits of engaging in any given behavior. 
If the costs imposed by the penalty outweigh the benefits of 
engaging in the behavior, they will choose not to engage in it. The 
law typically deters by increasing costs associated with certain 
behavior through punishment such as incarceration or monetary 
sanctions, although conceivably, the law could accomplish the 
same effect by reducing the benefits of the targeted behavior. 
Scholars often attempt to evaluate the deterrent effect of a given law 
by tracking measurements of behavior before and after the law 
comes into effect. 
Although deterrent laws are deemed efficient or inefficient 
depending on their success in reducing the undesirable behavior, 
not all deterrents are judged on the same standard of success. 
Behavior that is more despicable requires a less efficient deterrent 
to justify the imposition of costs; for example, most would probably 
agree that laws attempting to deter murder are justified, even if 
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they are relatively inefficient in preventing murders.11 On the other 
hand, laws that are inefficient at preventing smaller infractions (for 
example, turnstile jumping) may be less justifiable, as costs of 
enforcement outweigh the benefits of deterrence.12 
Some may object generally to use of cost-benefit analysis as a 
method of evaluating the benefits of a particular policy, in part 
because they disagree with utilitarianism as an ultimate goal or 
because such an analysis may be difficult to accomplish and 
therefore prove unreliable.13 However, the concept of deterrence 
inherently invites such an analysis, because it assumes that 
individuals subject to the law adopt a utilitarian approach by which 
they adjust their behavior. Laws that are justified on the grounds of 
deterrence have accordingly wed themselves to a utilitarian 
approach. Under this approach, laws that efficiently discourage the 
targeted behavior are good and should be enacted and upheld, and 
laws that do not efficiently discourage the targeted behavior are 
bad and should be abandoned. 
This approach is subject to challenge insofar as the analysis 
relies on a theoretical calculation of efficiency rather than a real-
world application. The theory of deterrence necessarily assumes 
that individuals who would be deterred by the punishment 
associated with the law are rational actors who engage in a rational 
analysis with all relevant facts. Obviously, insofar as these 
assumptions are incorrect, the analysis is imperfect. Actors cannot 
be deterred by laws of which they are unaware, and actors who do 
 
 11. The conversation regarding the death penalty as a deterrence is illustrative. See 
John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty 
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 792–94 (2005) (finding that evidence of deterrence is surprisingly 
fragile); Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1666 
(1986) (“Sparing the lives of even a few prospective victims by deterring their murderers is 
more important than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because of the possibility, 
or even the probability, that executing them would not deter others.”). 
 12. See Maura Ewing, Will New York Stop Arresting People for Evading Subway Fares?, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/new 
-york-subway-fares/535866/ (noting that Manhattan District Attorney Cy Vance recently 
announced the office would stop prosecuting fare beating); Ryan Kailath, New York Won’t 
Arrest You for Stealing a Subway Ride Anymore, MARKETPLACE (Aug. 31, 2017, 5:47 AM), 
https://www.marketplace.org/2017/08/31/economy/new-york-wont-arrest-you-stealing 
-subway-ride-anymore (noting that New York City’s Independent Budget Office estimated 
that prosecuting fare evasion cost $2,458 per arrest not including detention costs, while 
allowing free subway access would cost only a tenth of that). 
 13. See generally Robert H. Frank, Why Is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 913 (2000) (addressing common objections to a cost-benefit analysis). 
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not engage in a utilitarian analysis will not respond as anticipated 
to a given law. Accordingly, laws which are poorly understood, 
counterintuitive, or ignored by the public will prove more efficient 
in theory than they are in practice. Any model that seeks to 
accurately calculate the deterrent effect of a given law must factor 
in the extent to which the law is incorporated into decision-
making processes. 
Further, the baseline assumption of deterrence theory is that 
individuals will operate rationally to maximize their own objective 
benefit (the rational choice assumption). Even champions of the law 
and economics approach have recognized that “[t]here is simply 
too much credible experimental evidence that individuals frequent-
ly act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of 
rational choice theory” for it to stand as a justification alone and 
without modification.14 One of the purported benefits of the 
rational choice theory is its simplicity; this simplicity also limits its 
ability to predict behavior.15 Accordingly, an evaluation of a law’s 
deterrent effect, to be truly accurate, would need to take into 
account both the theoretical estimation of the law’s influence on 
behavior and also evidence of actual responsive behavior. 
For purposes of this Article, I assume that it is possible to 
effectively deter behavior and that deterrence may generally be 
predicted according to a cost-benefit analysis, incorporating a 
rational choice assumption.16 I evaluate preference law accordingly. 
I assume both that creditors act rationally, at least when engaging 
 
 14. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2000) (arguing for 
a “law and behavioral science” approach that would seek to understand the incentive effects 
of a law by drawing on psychological and sociocultural theories); see also David J. Arkush, 
Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for 
Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275 (2008) (arguing that emotion plays a role in most 
if not all decisions and is not readily amenable to maximization); Korobkin, supra at 1058; 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1554 (1998) (recognizing that “cognitive quirks” such as “the availability heuristic, 
overoptimism, the sunk-cost fallacy, loss aversion, and framing effects” will inform rational 
choice, but arguing that the fact that people are not always rational is not in itself a challenge 
to rational choice economics because it can be accounted for in models). 
 15. Robert H. Frank, Commitment Problems in the Theory of Rational Choice, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1789, 1790 (2003) (arguing for an alternative to the standard of rationality, which 
produces predictions that often turn out to be flatly incorrect). 
 16. I do not concede this point for at least two reasons. First, citizens are unlikely to be 
aware of the laws which ostensibly deter their behavior, and second, rational choice 
assumption is only marginally accurate in predicting behavior. 
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in business transactions giving rise to preference claims, and that 
creditors are solely incentivized to maximize their overall wealth, 
represented only in dollars. I therefore allow that a law which 
exacts a dollar cost from individuals for a given action is likely to 
discourage individuals from acting when the cost imposed by the 
law exceeds the dollar benefit of that action. Nevertheless, I 
conclude that preference law as written neither successfully 
identifies the actions it wishes to discourage nor imposes a 
sufficient cost to deter those actions. In support of this conclusion, 
I first lay out the theoretical underpinnings of deterrence. 
B. Becker’s Theory of Deterrence 
Gary S. Becker may justifiably be viewed as the father of the 
economic model of deterrence. The principles underlying his 
theory of criminal deterrence have been widely tested, both in and 
out of the criminal law context. Becker’s seminal paper examining 
the costs and benefits of incarcerating criminals was first published 
in 1968.17 In it, he suggested that the number of criminal offenses a 
person will engage in depends on such variables as (1) the 
probability of conviction, (2) the punishment if convicted, and (3) a 
“portmanteau” of other influences such as personal willingness to 
commit an illegal act, income available in legal and other illegal 
activities, and the frequency of nuisance arrests. He represented 
this thought by a simple equation: 
Oi = Oi (pi, fi, ui), 
with O representing the number of offenses, p the probability of 
conviction per offense, f the punishment per offense, and u all other 
variables.18 He reasoned that increases in any variable (p, f, or u) 
would tend to reduce the number of offenses, as the probable cost 
for each offense would grow with the likelihood of apprehension 
or cost of the penalty.19 Becker further argued that, in light of the 
costs to society associated with the imprisonment of offenders, 
 
 17. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169 (1968). 
 18. Id. at 177. 
 19. Id. 
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a better punishment would be to impose a series of fines when-
ever feasible.20 
Since Becker’s publication, multiple authors have adopted and 
tested this utility approach to criminal deterrence using empirical 
data in a variety of contexts.21 The associated formula has been 
altered to better emphasize the cost/benefit nature of the analysis 
as follows: 
E(U) = (1–p) U(y) + p U(y-F), 
where E(U) is the actor’s expected utility from an action, p is the 
likelihood of being punished, y is the anticipated returns from the 
activity, and F is the anticipated penalty if the actor is punished.22 
Under this formula, an actor’s likely utility (U) will be positive 
whenever the returns from the activity exceed the punishment 
associated with the activity, which is informed by how likely the 
actor is to be caught and punished. As pointed out by Irving 
Piliavin et al., an actor’s decision whether to engage in the activity 
will theoretically be informed by the expected rewards and costs as 
subjectively perceived by the actor, rather than their objective 
reality.23 This approach acknowledges that actors will act based on 
 
 20. Id. at 193. 
 21. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using 
Sentencing Enhancements, 4 AM. ECON. J. 32 (2012) (finding lower crime rate in states with 
enhanced punishments for committing crimes with a firearm); Gregory DeAngelo & 
Benjamin Hansen, Life and Death in the Fast Lane: Police Enforcement and Traffic Fatalities, 6 AM. 
ECON. J. 231 (2014) (finding that a decrease in enforcement via traffic citations is associated 
with a significant increase in injuries and fatalities caused by traffic accidents); Francesco 
Drago et al., The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 117 J. POL. 
ECON. 257 (2009) (finding in a study of Italian prisons that one month less time served in 
prison in exchange for one month more in expected sentence for future crimes had a negative 
impact on the probability of recidivism); Benjamin Hansen, Punishment and Deterrence: 
Evidence from Drunk Driving, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1581, 1608 (2015) (finding evidence that a 
10 percent increase in sanctions and punishments is associated with a 2.3 percent decline in 
drunk driving in the state of Washington); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three 
Strikes Deter?: A Nonparametric Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RESOURCES 309 (2007) (finding lower 
recidivism rates among convicts facing life in prison if convicted of a third strike in 
California); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and 
Evidence 1 (Princeton Univ., Dep’t Econ., Ctr. Econ. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 1168, 
2009) (finding minimal response by youth to the large change in penalties for crimes when 
they reach the age of eighteen). 
 22. Irving Piliavin et al., Crime, Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 101, 
101–02 (1986). 
 23. Id. at 102. 
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what they believe, rather than what is true. However, it remains the 
case that “[a] utility approach—like so much deterrence 
theorizing—assumes rationality in the decision to commit a 
crime.”24 Assuming rationality in the criminal context may be a 
fundamental error.  
C. Broader Application 
The rational choice assumption underpinning this deterrence 
theory may be easier to defend in the civil context, where it has also 
been applied. Concepts of deterrence arise frequently in discus-
sions of punitive damages, which may be awarded upon a finding 
of liability in tort. Punitive damages are typically justified on one 
or both of two grounds: first, that they may be necessary to achieve 
fairness in punishing a wrongdoing, and second, that they deter 
undesirable behavior.25 The first justification appeals to a sense of 
moral desserts, and the second to an efficiency analysis. With re-
gards to the deterrence justification, punitive damages can only be 
viewed as necessary to the extent that ordinary compensatory dam-
ages do not sufficiently discourage inappropriate behavior.26 What 
is more, because the possibility of punitive damages can increase 
litigation costs, the use of punitive damages can only be defended 
if the good to be obtained—deterrence—outweighs those costs.27 
In evaluating the efficiency of punitive damages as a means of 
deterrence, Dorsey Ellis has concluded that in most instances 
punitive damages are overkill because “[c]ompensatory damages 
ordinarily would appear to be sufficient to promote efficient levels 
of deterrence.”28 Indeed, some scholars, including Gary Schwartz, 
have argued that a primary purpose of tort liability as a whole, with 
its basic theory of damages, is to deter inappropriate behavior.29 
 
 24. Herbert Jacob, Rationality and Criminality, 59 SOC. SCI. Q. 584, 584 (1978). 
 25. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (1982) (distilling the purposes for punitive damages cited in judicial 
opinions and writings of commentators into punishment and deterrence). 
 26. See Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive 
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982) (noting that the primary purpose of 
tort liability itself is to deter inappropriate behavior by accident causers). 
 27. See Ellis, supra note 25, at 46. 
 28. Id. at 9. 
 29. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 137; see also Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: 
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1801 (1997) (identifying 
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Schwartz cites Richard Posner, who has argued that the Learned 
Hand formula of negligence represents an attempt to ensure 
efficiency in accident prevention by encouraging potential tort-
feasors to engage in a cost-benefit analysis, whereby they would 
prevent accidents when compensatory damages exceed the costs of 
prevention, but not otherwise.30 In other words, a tortfeasor should 
endeavor to prevent torts when the cost of prevention does not 
exceed the damages necessary to make a victim whole. On the other 
hand, if the costs of prevention exceed compensatory damages, 
tortfeasors should internalize those costs but not be required to 
engage in prevention. In addition, to the extent that a victim would 
be better placed to prevent harm (by taking due care) the tortfeasor 
should not be liable for costs associated with the victim’s own 
negligence.31 Posner does note that greater punishment (imposing 
of costs that exceed the victim’s damages) may be “necessary where 
the violator is frequently not apprehended, because a rational 
lawbreaker will discount the gravity of any legal sanction by the 
probability that it will be imposed.”32 
Preference liability is not directly analogous to either punitive 
damages or criminal behavior, but insofar as the law is intended to 
deter behavior, it lends itself to similar theoretical evaluation. As 
explained in greater depth below, actions giving rise to preference 
liability are highly unlikely to be punished (or even punishable) 
and the punishment typically meted out is significantly below the 
benefit received, or at most, equal to it. In practice, enforcement of 
preference law as a deterrence also raises additional concerns not 
addressed in the classic Becker model of deterrence, such as 
awareness of the law and the ability to weigh its likely conse-
quences in making a decision. 
 
tort scholars as either in the camp of tort liability as an instrument of deterrence or as a way 
of achieving corrective justice). 
 30. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972) (“Hand 
was adumbrating, perhaps unwittingly, an economic meaning of negligence.”). 
 31. Id. at 39. 
 32. Id. at 41. 
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III. PREFERENCE LAW 
A. Preference Liability and Defenses 
As one attorney makes a point of explaining to his clients, 
preference liability is a matter of timing, not of intent or 
culpability.33 Indeed, preference liability today34 has no explicit 
intent requirement on either the part of the debtor (to prefer the 
creditor over others) or the creditor (to come ahead of other 
creditors in repayment).35 Rather, qualification of a given transfer 
as “preferred” depends on whether it was (1) to or for the benefit 
of a creditor; (2) on account of an antecedent debt; (3) made while 
the debtor was insolvent; (4) during the preference period, 
generally ninety days before the bankruptcy filing;36 and whether 
it resulted (5) in the recipient receiving more than it would have 
had the transfer not been made and the estate liquidated pursuant 
to Chapter 7.37 Accordingly, otherwise entirely legal transactions 
 
 33. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (“[I]t’s got nothing to do with 
whether or not you did something wrong or right. It’s got everything to do with timing.”). 
Reference to statements by attorneys and creditors are drawn from interviews collected by 
this author as part of a research study examining the impact of Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceedings on business relationships between debtors and creditors. This study involved a 
total of 48 interviews from debtors, creditors, and their attorneys involved in a total of 
fourteen confirmed Chapter 11 cases closed sometime between August 30, 2010, and 
February 1, 2017, where preference actions had been filed against otherwise unsecured trade 
creditors. All interview transcripts have been stripped of identifying material and are on file 
with the author. See also discussion on Empirical Findings infra Section V.D. 
 34. The modern view of preference law as a law of strict liability was introduced in 
1978 with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. Prior to that time, every version of Amer-
ican bankruptcy legislation included an element of intent. See Lawrence Ponoroff, Evil Inten-
tions and an Irresolute Endorsement for Scientific Rationalism: Bankruptcy Preferences One More 
Time, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1439, 1478 (1993) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time]. 
 35. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of 
Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 259 (1981); see also In re Hall, 4 AM. BANKR. REP. ANN. 671, 678 
(1900) (critiquing the statutory move away from the intent requirement); Robert Weisberg, 
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN. 
L. REV. 3, 89–90 (1986) (discussing Referee Hotchkiss’s critique of the system in In re Hall). 
 36. For insiders, the preference period is extended to one year before the bankruptcy 
filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2012). 
 37. See 11 U.S.C. § 547. Any transfer prior to the bankruptcy will satisfy the 
requirement that the recipient be better off as a consequence when the creditor would have 
received less than 100% in a Chapter 7 payout. See Savage & Assocs., P.C. v. Mandl (In re 
Teligent Inc.), 380 B.R. 324, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Vern Countryman, The Concept of a 
Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 736–37 (1985). The full text of § 547(b) 
reads as follows: 
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between the debtor and creditor become subject to preference 
avoidance based entirely on when they occurred. Put another way, 
if the debtor transfers funds to a non-insider creditor on account of 
a legitimate debt, and then files for bankruptcy ninety-one days 
later, there are no legal ramifications. If the same transfer occurs 
eighty-nine days before a bankruptcy filing, the creditor may be 
liable to return the full amount to the bankruptcy estate. This law 
applies to all creditors in every bankruptcy case, whether it be 
consumer or commercial, reorganization or liquidation. Accord-
ingly, preference actions may be brought by a trustee in Chapter 7, 
11, or 13,38 but also by the debtor itself in Chapter 11 acting as a 
debtor-in-possession (DIP).39 
Preference liability is subject to a variety of possible defenses,40 
which lack a comprehensive rationality and instead respond to a 
myriad of legislative aims.41 The most hotly litigated defense to 
 
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee may 
avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such 
transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made— 
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the 
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would 
receive if— 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided 
by the provisions of this title. 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
 38. See id. §§ 704, 1106, 1302. A trustee appointed under Chapter 12, a less commonly 
used chapter in the Bankruptcy Code, may also bring a preference claim. See id. § 1202. 
 39. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1984). 
 40. These exceptions to preference liability are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)–(9) (2012). 
Only some of the exceptions are discussed here. 
 41. Cf. C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of 
Illusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265, 277 (1992) (“Preference law has always had difficulty 
distinguishing between preferential transactions which should be avoided and those which 
should be permitted to stand. In theory, transfers induced by the expectation or fear of an 
imminent bankruptcy should be avoided; but transfers in the ordinary course or business 
should stand, even though the debtor was insolvent and the creditor received more than it 
would have in an ensuing bankruptcy.”). 
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preference liability is the so-called “ordinary course” defense.42 
Under this exception, no liability attaches when the incurrence of 
the debt is made in the ordinary course of business and the pay-
ment of that debt is also made in the ordinary course of business or 
according to ordinary business terms.43 The ordinary course excep-
tion, being highly subjective, encourages litigation by requiring the 
interpretation of an impartial fact finder as to what is “ordinary.” 
This exception is frequently identified as support for the argument 
that preference law is intended to deter, as the exception seems to 
limit preference recovery to situations involving “non-ordinary” or 
unusual collection efforts.44 As explained below, this argument is 
problematic, but the ordinary course exception nevertheless re-
mains the poster child for preference law as deterrence. 
The next most commonly invoked exception for preference 
defendants is the new value defense.45 This defense permits 
creditors to avoid preference liability to the extent to which they 
have transferred new value to the debtor subsequent to accepting 
the preference. For example, suppose that on the eightieth day 
before bankruptcy the debtor paid a creditor $10,000 on account of 
a previous $20,000 balance. The creditor subsequently shipped an 
 
 42. Lawrence Ponoroff & Julie C. Ashby, Desperate Times and Desperate Measures: The 
Troubled State of the Ordinary Course of Business Defense—and What to Do About It, 72 WASH. L. 
REV. 5, 7 n.3 (1997) (“The ordinary course of business exception is by far the most litigated of 
the § 547(c) preference defenses and has been the source of keen interest to commentators.”). 
There is some suggestion in the mark-up minutes of the House subcommittee staff for the 
original language of the exception, which contained the forty-five-day lookback limitation, 
that it was also intended to set aside those payments for which debts were not truly 
“antecedent,” similar to the substantially contemporaneous exception. See Lissa Lamkin 
Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy 
Amendments, 1987 DUKE. L.J. 78, 98 n.97 (1987) (quoting Minutes of the Subcomm. on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1977) 
(statement of Mr. Kenneth Klee)). Subsequent amendments to the provision have removed 
the possibility that it serves such a purpose. See discussion infra notes 63–65 and accompany- 
ing text. 
 43. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (2012). The statute required a showing that a transfer was both 
made in the ordinary course of business and according to ordinary business terms until 2005, 
when the and was replaced with “or.” See Charles J. Tabb, The Brave New World of Bankruptcy 
Preferences, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 425, 428 (2005) [hereinafter Brave New Word]. 
 44. See A. Ari Afilalo, The Impact of Union Bank v. Wolas on the Ordinary Course of 
Business Defense to a Trustee’s Avoiding Powers, 72 B.U. L. REV. 625, 635 (1992) (explaining that 
the ordinary course of business exception is ultimately aimed at deterrence, not equality 
of distribution). 
 45. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(4) (2012). 
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additional $5,000 worth of goods to the debtor. Upon a bankruptcy 
filing, the creditor would be liable for a preference of $10,000 but 
would have a new value defense for the $5,000 of new value 
subsequently transferred to the debtor. The new value defense only 
applies to subsequent transfers to the debtor. In other words, had 
the creditor given the debtor the $5,000 of goods prior to the $10,000 
payment, there would be no defense. In theory, the defense is 
available to those creditors who have continued to assist the debtor 
by providing credit in the days leading up to bankruptcy. 
Pursuant to the definition of a “transfer,” preference liability 
may attach to the grant of a security interest. In other words, a 
creditor who signs a security agreement with the debtor within the 
ninety days before bankruptcy to secure a pre-existing debt may be 
subject to preference liability. However, purchase money security 
interests are excepted from preference liability when perfected 
within thirty days of the debtor receiving possession of the 
collateral,46 and statutory liens (such as mechanic’s liens or other 
security interests granted by operation of law) are also excepted 
from preference liability.47 Smaller transfers may be excepted from 
liability by way of a statutory minimum.48 For business cases, this 
minimum is around $6,000;49 for consumer cases it is around $600. 
Amendments to the Code in 2005 establishing venue rules for 
preference actions have also operated as a type of exception, by 
virtue of discouraging preference actions against an out-of-state 
creditor whose liability falls below a certain amount. In such cases, 
the creditor may only be sued in its own venue, which may 
discourage a trustee or DIP from bringing the claim by virtue of the 
additional costs associated with prosecuting a case out of state.50 
Although not a delineated exception to the rule, perhaps the 
most common and relevant exception to preference liability is made 
for wholly secured creditors. Any payments made to creditors 
supported by a security interest in collateral that exceeds the value 
of the debt will not be preferential transfers, because under 
 
 46. Id. § 547(c)(3). 
 47. Id. § 547(c)(6). 
 48. Id. § 547(c)(8)–(9). 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Brave New World, supra note 43, at 428. For more on the impact of venue 
provisions, see infra note 114. 
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bankruptcy law such creditors are assured that they will receive the 
full value of their claim. Accordingly, a secured creditor who 
receives payments against the debt in the days before bankruptcy 
would not receive any more than they would absent the transfer in 
a case under Chapter 7. As a consequence, creditors with the most 
leverage over the debtor and the best ability to force repayment are 
not subject to preference liability. That said, creditors who attempt 
to become secured just prior to bankruptcy may have that security 
revoked, as explained above.51 Similarly, judgment creditors who 
successfully execute a lien against the debtor’s property within the 
ninety days prior to a bankruptcy filing, but do not complete the 
foreclosure process by the time of filing, may also be required to 
give up their lien as a preferential transfer.52 
Liability for preference may result in a court order and a 
judgment against the creditor, although only a small percentage of 
preference actions ever make it to trial. Although data is difficult to 
gather on the subject, it is thought that a significant minority of 
actions are settled before any court filings are made, and many 
more are settled after the complaint is filed but before an answer is 
due.53 The remainder are generally handled on summary judgment. 
Creditors who refuse to settle a filed preference complaint or repay 
pursuant to a court judgment will have any claim against the 
debtor’s estate disallowed, and accordingly will receive nothing in 
the estate payout for sums they may still be owed by the debtor.54 
B. Legislative Rationale for Preference Law as Deterrence 
As a deterrent to collection on pre-existing debts, preference 
law runs directly counter to non-bankruptcy law in terms of 
 
 51. See supra prior paragraph. 
 52. Whether or not the lien will be considered an avoidable preference will depend in 
part upon the state law’s determination of when the lien becomes perfected, and in part on 
the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory definition of a transfer. See, e.g., Redmond v. Mendenhall, 
107 B.R. 318, 321–23 (D. Kan. 1989). 
 53. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, AM. BANKR. INST., ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY REPORT 8 
(1997) [hereinafter ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY]. 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012). In some cases, this appeared to be a deliberate strategy 
for the debtor. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“We never expected, 
necessarily, to recover a whole bunch of money but just disallowing their claim because they 
were the holder of an avoided transfer and didn’t pay it. . . . [T]hat was a motivating factor 
at times.”). 
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creditor incentives. Current state law legal regimes award creditors 
who are first to collect and provide no minimum recovery for 
slower creditors. In fact, the judicial system encourages creditors to 
bring their claims within a reasonably prompt time period, or risk 
losing their claims for repayment to the statute of limitations.55 If a 
creditor is successful in collecting from the debtor, this leaves the 
debtor with less cash, and a reduced ability to satisfy the claims of 
others or to maintain ongoing operations. Accordingly, creditor 
collection can prompt the need for a bankruptcy filing. The reason-
ing behind preference law is that if a creditor knows that successful 
collection efforts may be undone in the bankruptcy proceedings, 
the creditor will be less inclined to collect and more inclined to 
wait.56 The debtor will benefit by virtue of this “breathing room” 
and, if all goes well, may be able to overcome the difficulties that 
lead to insolvency without the assistance of the bankruptcy court. 
If this happens, all creditors benefit. 
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code points to 
Congressional perception that the race of creditors to collect should 
be discouraged, at least in cases where bankruptcy is a possibility. 
Preference law was expressly conscripted as the tool to deter such 
a race.57 By specifically referencing a “rac[e] to the courthouse” in 
discussion of preference law,58 the legislative history suggests that 
Congress was primarily concerned with creditors attempting to 
edge each other out by obtaining a judicial lien over the debtor’s 
property, or the functional equivalent, before other creditors could 
do so. It is worth noting that typical unsecured creditors cannot 
force a debtor to make a payment without invoking judicial 
 
 55. For example, the State of Missouri requires all actions upon contracts to be brought 
within five years, MO. REV. STAT. § 516.120 (2015), and South Carolina only permits such 
actions to be brought within three years. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530 (2015). 
 56. See Ponoroff, supra note 2, at 344. 
 57. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874 (the 
general policy of preference law is deterring “unusual action” by the debtor or creditors); 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177−78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 (“[B]y 
permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period 
before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember 
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy.”); H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 202 (1973) ( “First, it 
lessens the possibility of a scramble among creditors for advantage; second, it promotes 
equality; and third, it eliminates the incentive to make unwise loans in order to obtain a 
preferential payment or security.”). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177−78. 
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process, although creditors may vary in their ability to encourage 
repayment based on other factors, such as the debtor’s need for 
ongoing creditor services or the need to maintain its reputation 
with the creditor.59 
From an insolvent debtor’s perspective, it can be extra-
ordinarily harrying to manage the collection efforts of multiple 
creditors at a time when the debtor lacks the ability to repay all of 
its debts simultaneously. This activity can have a deleterious effect 
on the debtor’s ability to run its business. Further, there is the 
concern that efforts to collect may prompt what might be described 
as a “run on the bank,” with all creditors losing confidence 
simultaneously, obtaining judgments, seizing debtor assets, and 
obliterating any possibility that the debtor can make good on its 
claims to all.60 One of the motivating elements of the automatic stay 
in bankruptcy is to prevent further collection efforts not only to 
ensure that a given creditor cannot enrich itself at the expense of 
others but also to provide the debtor with the breathing room 
necessary to make an effectual comeback.61 Preference law, as a 
deterrence, seeks to advance “the corresponding goal” of encour-
aging breathing room prior to the filing.62 
 
 59. An effort to seize the debtor’s property without first obtaining a judgment lien or 
garnishment order would constitute the tort of conversion and open the creditor to liability. 
See Okyere v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 522, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“A 
conversion takes place when someone, intentionally and without authority, assumes or 
exercises control over personal property belonging to someone else, interfering with that 
person’s right of possession.”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: 
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1023 (2004) (“Under 
nonbankruptcy law, unsecured creditors have no property interest in their debtor’s assets 
until such time as they receive a judicial lien, normally following judgment and, as to 
personal property, the exercise of judicial remedies against the debtor’s assets.”). 
 60. See In re Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Unless the 
favoring of particular creditors is outlawed, the mass of creditors of a shaky firm will be 
nervous, fearing that one or a few of their number are going to walk away with all the firm’s 
assets . . . .”). 
 61. See In re Anderson, 913 F.2d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating courts should be 
reticent to infringe on the breathing room afforded a debtor in Chapter 11 by Congress); see 
generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5963, 6296–97. 
 62. Bankruptcy Preferences One More Time, supra note 34, at 1479 (“The corresponding 
goal of the preference law [is] deterring a frenzied pre-bankruptcy scramble to dismember 
the debtor’s estate . . . .”). It is worth noting that Professor Ponoroff further argued that this 
goal was difficult to defend in light of the change in law removing any intent requirement, 
and suggested that preference law was unlikely to have much of a deterrent effect. Id. 
 
002.GOTBERG_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:38 PM 
559 Optimal Deterrence 
 579 
Consistent with concerns over a race to collect through use of 
the judicial process, rather than what might be considered the 
ordinary amble of debt collection among creditors, Congress 
enacted the ordinary course exception to protect “normal” debt 
payments from liability, thereby more directly targeting “racing” 
behavior.63 Although what is “normal” is never fully defined, it 
presumably would not include demands for payment of past-due 
debts, whether or not such demands are accompanied by judicial 
action.64 As originally passed, the ordinary course exception was 
limited to the payment of a debt made in the ordinary course of 
business within forty-five days of the debt’s incurrence.65 As stated 
in the House and Senate Reports, “[t]he purpose of [the forty-five-
day ordinary course exception] is to leave undisturbed normal 
financial relations, because it does not detract from the general 
policy of the preference section [which is] to discourage unusual 
action by either the debtor or his creditors during the debtor’s slide 
into bankruptcy.”66 The forty-five-day language was later removed 
from the exception in the 1984 amendments in response to 
testimony that normal payment periods often exceeded forty-five 
days.67 Following that change, the Supreme Court ruled in Union 
Bank v. Wolas that interest payments on a seven-million-dollar loan 
pursuant to a revolving credit agreement fell within the ordinary 
course exception.68 This ruling startled many who considered the 
 
 63. See Fiber Lite Corp. v. Molded Acoustical Prods., Inc. (In re Molded Acoustical 
Prods., Inc.), 18 F.3d 217, 224–25 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing O’Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 
F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984)) (“Bankruptcy policy, as evidenced by the very existence of 
§ 547(c)(2), is to promote . . . continuing relationships on level terms, relationships which if 
encouraged will often help businesses fend off an unwelcome voyage into the labyrinths of 
a bankruptcy.”). 
 64. But see Darrell Dunham & Donald Price, The End of Preference Liability for Unse-
cured Creditors: New Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 60 IND. L.J. 487, 500 (1985) (sug-
gesting that the ordinary course exception could be interpreted to encompass all business- 
related transactions). 
 65. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. III, sec. 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378. 
 66. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 88 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5874; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 373 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329; see also Broome, supra 
note 42, at 98–99 (noting that the forty-five-day period appeared to be selected on the basis 
of a one-month normal billing cycle). 
 67. See Broome, supra note 42, at 100–05 (describing complaints made to Congress on 
behalf of trade creditors, commercial paper issuers, and consumer lenders). 
 68. Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 162 (1991). 
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opinion a clear deviation from the intended scope of the 
exception.69 Under current law, therefore, preference liability is 
nominally limited to those transfers that cannot be characterized as 
falling within the ordinary course of business or having been made 
according to ordinary business terms. 
The ordinary course exception is a defense which must be 
raised and supported by the defending creditor in a contest of 
preference liability. There is no requirement on the part of the 
trustee or the DIP to establish the lack of such a defense before 
bringing the claim. Accordingly, even those creditors who fall with-
in the ordinary course exception are vulnerable to a claim by the 
trustee and may thus be obligated to expend time and energy in 
defending that claim, either to the trustee in settlement negotiations 
or before the court in trial. The necessity of bringing an affirmative 
defense is relevant in determining the deterrent power associated 
with preference law, discussed in greater depth below. 
There is some indication in the discussion of lawmakers that 
deterrence is a secondary goal of preference law, with the primary 
goal being equal distribution among creditors.70 Multiple scholars 
have adopted this approach and criticized elements of preference 
 
 69. See Broome, supra note 42 at 121 (arguing that the legislative history of § 547(c)(2) 
evinces that Congress intended the exception to be limited to payments to trade creditors, 
not payments on long-term debt); Peter A. Davidson, ZZZZ Best—Ordinary Course Protection 
for Long-Term Debt, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 45, 45 (1992) (“The Court’s decision, however, should 
not come as a surprise to anyone who has paid heed to the Court’s recent, strict 
constructionist theme.”); Debbi L. Rauanheimo, Case in Controversy—Section 547(c)(2) 
Remains Uncertain After ZZZZ Best, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 419, 419 (1992). 
 70. See H. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–78 (“The purpose of the preference section is two-
fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a 
short period before bankruptcy, creditors are discouraged from racing to the courthouse to 
dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy. . . . Second, and more important, the 
preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution 
among creditors of the debtor.”); Broome, supra note 42, at 115 (noting that, after 1978, the 
main goal of preference law was to preserve equality of distribution, with deterrence only 
an incidental objective); Countryman, supra note 37, at 748 (“The function of the preference 
concept is to avoid prebankruptcy transfers that distort the bankruptcy policy of 
distribution.”); McCoid, supra note 35, at 260 (“Equal treatment of creditors is the oldest and 
most frequently advanced goal of preference law.”); Weisberg, supra note 35, at 4 
(“Bankruptcy law empowers the trustee and the court to enforce ratable distribution as a 
matter of public power; preference law implies that the debtor and creditor have a private 
duty to save the bankruptcy process from becoming moot before it has a chance to start.”). 
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law that undermine this notion of equality.71 I have previously 
argued that preference law as an equalizing mechanism is unneces-
sarily hampered by exceptions that purport to deter undesirable 
behavior.72 Nonetheless, other scholars view deterrence as the 
primary justification for preference law, or at least emphasize the 
need for preference law to fulfill its role of deterrence, even if it 
undercuts other goals.73 To these scholars, preference law has 
[a] necessary and important role . . . in controlling express opt-out 
behavior by in-the-know creditors . . . who . . . shore up their 
positions in derogation of the bankruptcy priority scheme by 
obtaining or perfecting liens, seizing assets, pressuring the debtor 
for transfers and payments, or otherwise accepting property from 
the debtor in respect of claims on the eve of bankruptcy.74 
These scholars see the exceptions to preference liability, parti-
cularly the ordinary course of business defense, as limiting the sting 
of preference liability to those who collect as a response to the 
perceived insolvency or pending failure of the debtor.75 
 
 71. See Broome, supra note 42, at 115 (“After Congress removed the ‘reasonable cause 
to believe’ requirement in 1978, the main goal of the preference provision was to preserve 
equality of distribution; the prevention of unusual pressure or action by the creditor became 
only an incidental objective.”) (quoting H. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177–78); Ponoroff & Ashby, 
supra note 42, at 19 (“[T]he lack of improper ulterior motive in inducing or accepting payment 
from a debtor is no longer a sufficient basis for allowing one creditor to achieve a better result 
than its similarly placed counterparts.”); Charles Jordan Tabb, Rethinking Preferences, 43 S.C. 
L. REV. 981, 990 (1992) [hereinafter Rethinking Preferences] (submitting that it should be 
irrelevant whether preferred creditors knowingly obtained payment from a debtor likely to 
seek bankruptcy relief or not). 
 72. See Gotberg, supra note 2, at 59. 
 73. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, The Problem with Preferences, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 11, 15 
(2014) (“[P]reference law has always emphasized controlling [knowing attempts to recover 
ahead of other creditors] over forced disgorgement of innocently received preferences.”). 
 74. Id. at 14–15. 
 75. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635 (arguing that the ordinary course of business 
exception extends protection to those who are not racing to the courthouse); Bussel, supra 
note 73 (“The defenses to preference law are designed largely to protect innocent receipt of 
preferences; they commonly do not apply to parties that can be shown to have deliberately 
subverted ratable distribution on the eve of bankruptcy.”). At least one author has argued 
for greater protection for creditors and an expansion of defenses on these grounds. See 
Michael J. Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique of Section 547(c)(1), (2) & 
(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 691–92 (1983) (arguing that trade creditors 
who recognize a buyer’s drift into bankruptcy but nonetheless continue to do business with 
the debtor deserve significant protection from preference liability). 
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Although the primary purpose of this Article is not to challenge 
the merit of congressional intent behind preference law as a 
deterrence, a few points are worth raising in response to this goal, 
if only in passing. First, the assumption that debtors are better off 
struggling to repay debt outside bankruptcy, rather than inside 
bankruptcy, is not clearly supported in practice. Debtors may be 
better off in the long run and may more successfully reorganize 
when they are pushed to file earlier (perhaps in response to 
collection efforts) rather than later. Put another way, a marginally 
insolvent company may be significantly easier to reorganize than a 
significantly insolvent company. Second, Congress is not altogether 
clear as to which “courthouse” it wishes to deter creditors from 
visiting. The Bankruptcy Code does permit creditors to file an 
involuntary petition to invoke bankruptcy proceedings against an 
unwilling debtor.76 Creditors are encouraged by virtue of 
preference law to use a bankruptcy filing (or threat of filing) to force 
the clawback of payments the debtor may have made to other 
creditors.77 Finally, attempting to deter creditor collection for a 
ninety-day period ignores the possible detrimental effect that 
prolonged non-payment will have on those creditors, who 
presumably have their own bills to pay in the meantime. Arguably, 
it would be better for all involved if resolution of outstanding debts 
were accomplished on a faster timeframe. 
IV. THE GAP BETWEEN INTENDED AND ACTUAL TARGETS 
Assuming, arguendo, that the goal of deterring opt-out behavior 
from creditors who seek to “scramble . . . for advantage” is a 
worthy one,78 and that creditors are rational actors who take 
preference law into account in making decisions to collect on 
debts,79 preference law is nevertheless fundamentally flawed as a 
 
 76. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012). 
 77. See Interview with Paul Hoffmann (Feb. 9, 2018) (“When I represent creditors 
dealing with debtors in financial distress, I routinely advise them to look for evidence of 
preferential transfers because that is a sign that they should seriously consider filing an 
involuntary case.”) (notes in possession of author). 
 78. H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, at 202 (1973). 
 79. This is yet another questionable assumption, particularly for creditors unfamiliar 
with preference law. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; E-mail from Paul Schrader, 
Fullerton Law, to author (Mar. 26, 2018, 5:14 PM CST) (“[T]he idea of refusing payment when 
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deterrent. The most obvious flaw is that preference liability utterly 
fails to discriminate between creditors who are deliberately 
attempting to “opt-out” of the bankruptcy distribution and 
creditors who are totally ignorant of the debtor’s financial stress. 
One of the reasons creditors prove to be consistently resentful of 
preference liability is that they cannot comprehend how they are 
considered “preferred” when they have no close association with 
the debtor and had no knowledge of the debtor’s planned 
bankruptcy filing. Such creditors frequently have significant 
unsecured debt outstanding, despite the transfer, that will be 
discharged in the bankruptcy. Preference law fails to exclusively 
target bad actors; instead it affects any transferees who happen to 
fall within the ninety-day window.80 
A. Bad Actors 
No doubt in large part because of the competing rationales for 
preference law, the targets of preference liability have shifted over 
the years. Early English preference law, as interpreted by Lord 
Mansfield in Alderson v. Temple,81 suggested that only fraudulent 
collection efforts, or those undertaken “manifestly to defeat the 
law” are “bad.”82 In other words, voluntary efforts by the debtor to 
favor certain creditors over others were the target, and transfers 
made to creditors that demanded, sued, or threatened the debtor to 
induce repayment they were legally entitled to were not subject to 
preference law.83 Early preference law in the United States under 
the 1841 Act also targeted transfers made by the debtor “in 
contemplation of bankruptcy” and “for the purpose of giving any 
 
a debtor wants to pay you is so detached from standard commercial practice that it just 
cannot be conceived of as ‘rational’ by even the best-informed creditor.”) (on file 
with author). 
 80. This is deliberate in light of the overarching goal of equality. Scholars have argued 
against attempts to distinguish between creditors based on their intentions in accepting a 
preference, as the intention ultimately has no impact on the ultimate reduction of the estate. 
See Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 992 (“More than anything else, preference 
theory needs to shake off this antiquated morality notion and embrace instead the 
equality principle.”). 
 81. Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1768). 
 82. Id. at 385. 
 83. Id.; 8 WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 237 (2d 
ed. 1937). 
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creditor . . . any preference or priority over the general creditors,”84 
with liability hinging on the debtor’s intent, rather than the 
creditors’. The law changed in 1867 to include in its evaluation 
whether or not a recipient creditor had reasonable cause to believe 
the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer.85 By the 1898 
Act, the American law had changed focus to look exclusively at 
creditor intent, limiting liability to those cases in which “the person 
receiving [the transfer] . . . shall have had reasonable cause to 
believe that it was intended thereby to give a preference.”86 Proven 
ignorance of the debtor’s financial situation was a defense to 
preference liability. 
The Bankruptcy Code, passed in 1978, ultimately eliminated 
any requirement that the creditor be aware of a debtor’s insolvency 
or that the debtor intend to favor a particular creditor, establishing 
preference as a matter of strict liability.87 Many scholars view this 
legislative move as evidence that preference law was not intended 
and should not be used to distinguish between “innocent” and 
“culpable” creditors,88 and accordingly criticize mechanisms like 
the ordinary course exception that do make distinctions between 
creditors.89 Others continue to advocate for exceptions to 
preference liability on the justification that they protect creditors 
who lack the intent or motivation to undermine the bankruptcy 
 
 84. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The law further 
provided that one who granted a preference to a creditor would be denied discharge. 
 85. See 14 Stat. 517, ch. 176, § 35 (1867) repealed by 20 Stat. 99 (1878). 
 86. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978); see also 
Raymond T. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the Code, 
17 HOUS. L. REV. 289, 291 (1980) (discussing at length the requirements for preference liability 
under the Bankruptcy Act). 
 87. See discussion supra note 33; see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 214–15 (1973). 
“That [intent] requirement, more than any other, has rendered ineffective the preference 
section of the present Act.” Id. at 204. 
 88. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 992 (“More than anything else, preference 
theory needs to shake off this antiquated morality notion and embrace instead the equal-
ity principle.”). 
 89. See Countryman, supra note 37, at 775–76 (1985) (arguing that the ordinary course 
exception should be repealed as it conflicts with preference policy); Rethinking Preferences, 
supra note 71, at 1034 (proposing to repeal the ordinary course exception to increase the 
certainty in and simplicity of preference lawsuits). 
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distribution.90 Congress toyed with the idea of amending the 
Bankruptcy Code shortly after its adoption to reinsert a “reasonable 
cause to believe” requirement as an element of a preferential 
transfer, presumably to protect creditors who were not aware of the 
debtor’s financial issues, but ultimately failed to do so.91 
Scholars who do view contemporary preference law as a means 
to deter bad creditor behavior disagree on precisely the type of 
behavior that should be subject to deterrence. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to parse out who are the bad actors—the individuals who 
should be liable under preference law in order to deter their 
bad acts. Instead, much of the discussion surrounding how 
preference law and its exceptions should be drafted has stemmed 
from opinions regarding who should not be subject to pref-
erence liability. 
Lawrence Ponoroff and other prominent scholars have argued 
that the ordinary course exception arose in large part to protect 
“small, local suppliers of routine, open account credit.”92 In other 
words, preference law was not intended to affect “recurring, 
customary credit transactions that would have taken place in the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s and creditor’s businesses regardless 
of whether the prospect of a bankruptcy filing was looming or 
not.”93 The goal was simply to prevent unusual or extreme 
collection efforts.94 There is some suggestion that the ordinary 
course exception was passed in particular to protect trade creditors, 
defined loosely as creditors who do not function as lenders, but 
rather extend credit by permitting delayed payment for goods and 
services.95 For example, members of Congress proposed exceptions 
 
 90. See, e.g., Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635; see also Charles Jordan Tabb, Panglossian 
Preference Paradigm? 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407, 412 (1997) (“The idea that only abnormal 
prebankruptcy grabs should be avoidable, entrenched for several hundred years, apparently 
is here to stay.”). 
 91. See Broome, supra note 42, at 107. 
 92. Ponoroff & Ashby, supra note 42, at 16; see also Countryman, supra note 37, at 769  
(“If there was an intent to limit the [ordinary course] exception also to ‘trade debt,’ the 
draftsmen must have despaired of attempting to define that frequently used but intensely 
undefined term, and invoked the forty-five day limitation in recognition that most of the 
trade debt at which they were aiming was short term.”). 
 93. Ponoroff & Ashby, supra note 42, at 18. 
 94. See Nimmer, supra note 86, at 291. 
 95. See, e.g., Broome, supra note 42, at 121. 
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to preference law for debts associated with delivery of goods in the 
three months prior to bankruptcy, and debts for personal services.96 
However, congressional revisions to the law ultimately led to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling that long-term debt issued by a lender 
would satisfy the ordinary course exception,97 leaving the 
exception more uncertain and less targeted towards its original 
intended beneficiaries.98 
Some scholars have argued that the size of the transfer is what 
matters and that small creditors or small transfers should be 
exempt from the law, but this position is not without its critics. 
Daniel Bussel has argued that pursuit of small preference actions is 
akin to reorganizing deck chairs on the Titanic, and pushed for a 
higher cap on preference liability actions.99 On the other hand, 
Charles Tabb has voiced opposition to such a move on the 
argument that a statutory cap for liability not only undermines the 
equality goal of preference but also “might well encourage 
aggressive pre-petition debt collection efforts for amounts of a few 
thousand dollars, but slightly below [the cap].”100 
In light of Congress’ expressed intention to discourage a “race 
to the courthouse” and the premature dismantling of the debtor, it 
is my view that the true “bad actors” Congress sought to deter must 
be those with actual power to dismantle the debtor.101 The reference 
to the courthouse suggests that those Congress had in mind were 
judgment creditors—those who had successfully brought suit 
 
 96. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, at 168 (1973) (proposed exceptions for “(A) a debt for personal 
services, (B) a debt for utilities incurred within three months of the petition, [or] (C) a debt 
for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery of the goods in the ordinary course 
of the debtor’s business.”). 
 97. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 162 (1991). 
 98. See Tabb, supra note 43, at 441 (suggesting that the ABI Report demonstrates that 
the ordinary course exception is not working well because “no one knows what it means, . . . 
the application of the defense is inconsistent[, and] . . . many respondents do not believe that 
the defense affords sufficiently broad protection”). 
 99. Bussel, supra note 73, at 12. 
 100. Brave New Word, supra note 43, at 434. 
 101. A broader reading of congressional intent would be that Congress intended to 
discourage any attempt, however routine or ineffectual, to collect, although most discussion 
by courts interpreting the law seems to imply the need for collection to have a significant or 
disruptive effect on the debtor. See, e.g., In re Forman Enters., Inc., 293 B.R. 848, 855 (Bankr. 
W.D. Penn. 2003); In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 184 B.R. 136, 140 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995); In re 
Bourgeois, 58 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986); In re Air Fla. Sys. Inc., 50 B.R. 653, 656 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985). 
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against the debtor—and who would be in a position to dismantle 
the debtor by executing liens on the debtor’s property pursuant to 
their judgments. With the debtor’s property in the sheriff’s hands, 
it would be impossible for the debtor to conduct business. In order 
to continue, the debtor would be forced to file for bankruptcy, if 
only to impose the automatic stay and enforce return of the estate 
property to the debtor. In contrast, unsecured creditors who have 
not yet obtained a judgment against a debtor have relatively little 
leverage or ability to impact the debtor’s business. They cannot 
exercise self-help to insist on repayment and are limited to 
collection tactics such as withholding future services and making 
demanding phone calls. Nonetheless, it is often these unsecured 
creditors—commonly trade creditors—who have extended credit 
in the form of delayed payment on goods and services, who are 
targeted by preference liability, despite the general perception that 
such creditors were intended to be protected from liability. 
B. True Targets 
It is not uncommon for trade creditors to find themselves 
subject to preference liability. Despite this, and perhaps because of 
the relative infrequency of bankruptcy itself, many trade creditors 
are astonished to hear that they are being sued, particularly when 
they are still owed money by the debtor. Among this group, the less 
sophisticated and less important creditors tend to suffer the most 
from preference enforcement.102 Creditors who are familiar with 
the law are more likely to take advantage of its defenses, and 
creditors who are viewed as vital to the debtor’s survival are 
typically not targeted, at least not by a DIP in Chapter 11.103 
Per the statute, a trustee may bring a preference action without 
consideration of whether potential defenses exist.104 Still, before 
 
 102. See discussion infra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Brook E. Gotberg, Relational Preference in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 71 OKLA. L. 
REV.  (forthcoming). 
 104. The International Housewares Association (IHA), a major trade organization, 
proposed in 2014 that § 547 be amended to shift the burden of proof to the trustee, rather 
than creditors, that a payment is not a preference. See, e.g., Examining Sect. 547 and Its Effect 
on Trade Creditors—Episode 153, AM. BANKR. INST. (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.abi.org 
/podcasts/examining-sect-547-and-its-effect-on-trade-creditors-episode-153 [hereinafter 
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committing to the cost of filing a formal complaint, trustees often 
engage in letter-writing campaigns to all creditors who received 
transfers from the debtor in the ninety days before the bankruptcy 
filing, citing the preference statute and demanding a return of the 
funds transferred.105 Well-advised creditors typically respond with 
evidence of possible defenses, which often leads to settlement of 
those claims with the trustee for substantially less than what has 
been demanded.106 Less sophisticated creditors may not realize that 
defenses are available and when faced with the prospect of liability 
may simply repay the entire amount.107 Although the exceptions to 
preference law were intended to shield ordinary transactions from 
liability, less sophisticated creditors may be unaware of these 
defenses and may be unable or unwilling to hire counsel to defend 
against a preference in a situation where they are already 
losing money. 
In Chapter 11, unsecured creditors who qualify for the coveted 
title of “critical vendor” are not subject to preference liability. 
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not acknowledge the term or 
the concept of a critical vendor, courts across the country have 
granted debtor motions to pay certain unsecured creditors their 
pre-bankruptcy claims prior to the confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization.108 In support of a critical vendor motion, the debtor 
argues that the ongoing cooperation of a specific creditor is 
essential to the debtor’s reorganization and cannot be obtained 
 
Examining Sect. 547] (conversation between ABI Residence Scholar Lois Lupica and Dale 
Matschullat, Chairman of IHA, and Bruce Kaminstein, CEO of Casabella Holdings, LLC). 
 105. In some cases, the trustee may not have time to engage in such a letter writing 
campaign, however, and may find it necessary to file the action without preliminary 
discussion or negotiation. A trustee faces a statute of limitations in bringing the preference 
action and must sometimes file complaints without engaging in significant background 
research simply in order to preserve the cause of action. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2006) 
(imposing two-year statute of limitations on avoidance actions under § 547); COMMERCIAL 
FIN. ASS’N, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMERCIAL FINANCE ASSOCIATION TO THE ABI 
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (Nov. 15, 2012) (complaining that trustees 
need not weigh the likely value of their claims, and encouraging imposing a pleading burden 
on trustees that there are no relevant defenses). 
 106. See Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (“Not because you’re afraid to 
take it to trial, that’s not the issue. The issue is, . . . what’s the cost for that litigation versus 
what’s the exposure and what you need to pay to be done with this.”). 
 107. See ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53; discussion infra note 175. 
 108. See Alan N. Resnick, The Future of the Doctrine of Necessity and Critical-Vendor 
Payments in Chapter 11 Cases, 47 B.C. L. REV. 183, 183 (2005). 
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without repayment. Courts justify the special treatment of such 
creditors under § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and pre-Code 
practices affording equitable priority to certain unsecured 
creditors.109 Although not every court recognizes or upholds critical 
vendor motions,110 creditors who qualify for critical vendor status 
are typically immune from preference liability.111 Likewise, courts 
have held that prepetition payments made under an executory 
contract assumed by the debtor cannot be recovered as 
preferences.112 A DIP may also simply elect not to pursue a claim 
against a particular creditor, in order to avoid souring the 
relationship or engaging in what is likely to be protracted 
litigation.113 Other creditors may also escape preference liability on 
the basis of the size of their claim and their location vis-à-vis the 
 
 109. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012); Resnick, supra note 108, at 186. Although generally 
perceived to grant bankruptcy judges discretion to ensure that reorganizations will not be 
unnecessarily stilted by inflexible rules, use of § 105(a) is subject to heavy criticism when 
used in ways perceived to be contrary to the rest of the Code. See, e.g., Law v. Siegel, 134 S. 
Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014) (requiring that § 105(a) yield to prohibitions found elsewhere in 
the Code). 
 110. See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004); Chiasson v. J. Louis 
Matherne & Assocs. (In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329 (5th Cir. 1993); B&W Enters., Inc. 
v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 111. See Andrew J. Currie & Sean McCann, Hold on to Those Payments, Critical Vendors: 
Capital Factors v. Kmart, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2003, at 33, 35 (“[V]endors should use an 
agreement to provide post-petition goods and services on customary terms as an 
opportunity to extract a promise from the debtor that it will not seek to assert preference 
claims (or § 549 claims) against the vendor.”); Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) 
(noting that debtors may defend the decision not to pursue a preference on a creditor’s status 
as critical vendor). 
 112. See Newpage Corp. v. Avoca Bement Corp. (In re Newpage Corp.), 517 B.R. 508, 
514 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014); MPF Holding U.S. L.L.C. v. Mustang Eng’g Ltd. (In re MPF Holding 
U.S. L.L.C.), 495 B.R. 303 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013). 
 113. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012) (noting that a trustee “may” avoid a preferential 
transfer); see also discussion infra note 134 and accompanying text; Telephone Interview 
with CA (May 25, 2017) (noting that some debtors may decide not to bring preference 
actions for reputational reasons); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“I mean, 
if it’s a smaller dollar amount and the liability is questionable, then maybe you don’t 
pursue those claims. I mean, this is kind of a cost-benefit analysis. If it’s a million dollars, 
then you’re going to look at it much more seriously, but ten thousand dollars, you can 
easily [eat] that with the legal fees; just to try to get it.”); Telephone Interview with DA 
(May 25, 2017) (weighing considerations of collectability, noting that most preference actions 
are waived in a true reorganization). 
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debtor, usually points that are irrelevant to the creditor’s influence 
over a bankruptcy filing.114 
The less sophisticated, less informed, and less important 
creditors that do find themselves subject to preference liability 
usually lack any control over a debtor’s bankruptcy filing, 
including the power to effectively “push” a debtor into bankruptcy. 
Frequently, such creditors have taken no affirmative action against 
the debtor at all but have merely accepted payment on account of 
their outstanding debts at the wrong time, and in the wrong way—
that is, outside one of the delineated exceptions to preference 
liability. Preference law punishes rather than deters such creditors, 
as they typically are unaware that liability is a possibility when they 
collect.115 Further, the behavior of such creditors punished by 
preference law is frequently the passive acceptance of payment 
rather than any affirmative action, including a “race to the 
courthouse.” On the other hand, by excluding more savvy creditors 
with power to impact the debtor, by virtue of exceptions and 
discretion in bringing actions, the law allows some creditors who 
may have deliberately improved their position prior to bankruptcy 
at the expense of other creditors to escape liability. In sum, the law 
fundamentally fails to target the behavior it wishes to deter by 
being both under- and over-inclusive of transfers. 
V. PREFERENCE MODEL OF DETERRENCE 
As explained in this Part, the law fails to deter even individuals 
who are familiar with its parameters because the likelihood of 
liability and the penalty associated with preference liability 
together do not justify the alteration of behavior pursuant to a 
rational cost-benefit analysis. As discussed in Part II, a model can 
gauge the effectiveness of penalties in deterring any inappropriate 
 
 114. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1409 (West 2016), the trustee is required to bring actions 
for amounts less than $12,850 within the district court in which the defendant resides. This 
alteration likely encouraged bankruptcy trustees to be more selective about cases they choose 
to bring in distant venues, as it will cost the estate more to prosecute cases abroad. See Brave 
New Word, supra note 43. 
 115. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71 (“Deterrence is effective, however, only 
against parties who are aware of the debtor’s financial distress and who therefore see the 
collective proceeding coming. Innocent parties by definition will not be deterred; the state of 
the preference law will have no impact on their behavior.”); see also Nimmer, supra note 86, 
at 292. 
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behavior. The model for preference law, unfortunately, is not easy 
to apply. It must incorporate uncertainty regarding enforcement, 
due to factors over which the creditor has virtually no control, and 
uncertainty regarding the associated punishment, due to a mix of 
factors only some of which the creditor can control. This model, like 
Becker’s, does not explicitly acknowledge the weaknesses of 
rational choice theory, including other factors that influence 
individual behavior. But it is unnecessary to challenge the rational 
choice assumption; even under that assumption, it is evident that 
preference law is an ineffective deterrent. As I demonstrate in this 
Part, empirical evidence further supports the conclusion that most 
creditors do not change their behavior in response to preference 
law, at least not in ways intended by the statute. The primary 
factors within the preference model are, as in Becker’s model, the 
likelihood of enforcement and the severity of the punishment 
associated with preference liability. 
A. Likelihood of Punishment 
1. Requirement of bankruptcy 
Uncertainty regarding enforcement arises in preference law 
because preferential transfers are only subject to punishment if the 
debtor—or in rare cases, another creditor116—elects to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy and federal bankruptcy laws by 
filing a bankruptcy petition. The likelihood of bankruptcy is 
uncertain even in cases where the debtor is clearly insolvent, as the 
debtor may decide to attempt other methods of reorganization or 
simply to go out of business.117 Bankruptcy may be the most visible 
and even the most common method for companies to attempt to 
turn around their financial affairs, but it is by no means the only 
option. An effort to increase the use of state insolvency proceedings 
 
 116. Creditors may file involuntary cases against a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2012). 
 117. See Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts 
and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 260–61 (2009) (reporting that in 1990, business 
bankruptcy filings amounted to only about twelve percent of all business failures). It is worth 
noting that most business failures involve no attempt to reorganize at all. Instead, the 
company simply ceases to exist as a going concern, and creditors are left to attempt collection 
efforts under state law or write off losses, as the situation allows. Id. 
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has been observed across recent years,118 and the majority of states 
do not recognize a general cause of action for preferential 
transfers.119 Accordingly, in most cases there will be no preference 
liability if a debtor does not file for bankruptcy. 
In addition to requiring a bankruptcy filing, preference liability 
is also limited to situations where the debtor has filed within ninety 
days of a given transfer. In absolute terms, the likelihood of any 
given business filing for bankruptcy within a three-month period is 
very low. Out of an estimated 29 million businesses in the United 
States,120 less than 6000 companies file for bankruptcy in a given 
three-month period.121 This places the likelihood of a given com-
pany filing for bankruptcy at roughly 0.02%. Some bankruptcies 
may be easier to predict than others, and obviously the likelihood 
of a bankruptcy filing may be higher if the company is known to be 
struggling, but even then, bankruptcy is not an inevitability. The 
ultimate decision of whether and when to file for bankruptcy 
generally lies with the debtor. More sophisticated creditors may 
negotiate with debtors to file more than ninety days after a 
particular transfer has taken place, but most unsecured creditors 
have little to no influence over the timing of a bankruptcy.122 
 
 118. See, e.g., Andrew B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy?, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 
137 (2016). 
 119. Many states do have preference laws that apply in the context of bank or insurance 
company insolvency. Such companies may not be debtors under federal bankruptcy law. See 
11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2012); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and 
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 493, 516–26 (1994) (arguing for shifting authority 
over corporate bankruptcy back to the states to encourage greater consistency between state 
and federal insolvency laws). Roughly half of all state preference actions require a showing 
of preferential intent from the debtor, which is difficult to prove and entirely absent from 
federal law. See Broome, supra note 42, at 93–94. 
 120. See OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
1 (June 2016), http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/SB-FAQ-2016_WEB.pdf 
(estimate is as of 2013). 
 121. U.S. Courts’ statistics report a total of 5669 commercial filings (including farms, 
fisheries, and wage worker filings identified as “business filings”) for the first quarter of 
2018, U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA TABLES tbl.F-2 (Mar. 31, 2018), http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_f2.3_0331.2018.pdf; and a total of 
23,157 commercial filings in the entire year of 2017, U.S. COURTS, CASELOAD STATISTICS DATA 
TABLES tbl.F-5A (Dec. 31, 2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables 
/bf_f5a_1231.2017.pdf. 
 122. Creditors cannot control the risk of a bankruptcy filing by prohibiting a debtor 
from filing a bankruptcy case or by invoking penalties for filing for bankruptcy. Such 
attempts are rendered null and void pursuant to bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
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2. Uncertainty of enforcement 
Prior studies of deterrence have concluded that probability of 
conviction is significantly more impactful to deterrence than the 
severity of punishment.123 Preference liability within a bankruptcy 
case is highly contingent upon a variety of factors, including the 
chapter of bankruptcy in which the case will proceed, the 
availability of defenses for vulnerable creditors, the presence and 
activity of a creditor’s committee, and the intended outcome of the 
company in the reorganization proceedings. The creditor’s 
relationship with and importance to the debtor’s business going 
forward may also play a factor, both for critical vendors and for 
other creditors not so specified.124 
Preference actions are significantly more common in Chapter 7 
liquidation proceedings and Chapter 11 liquidation cases than in 
Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. The most obvious expla-
nation for the discrepancy is that all parties recognize that 
preference proceedings—effectively lawsuits raised by the debtor 
against the creditors—may be bad for business and bad for 
relationships going forward.125 Accordingly, debtors are typically 
reluctant to pursue preference actions in reorganization 
proceedings where ongoing relationships are important. The same 
reluctance does not exist in liquidation proceedings where there is 
 
§§ 365(e)(1), 541(c)(1)(B) (2012). On the other hand, creditors may offer benefits to a debtor 
on the condition that the debtor not file for bankruptcy, and otherwise work with the debtor 
in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy proceedings. Such efforts to negotiate an agreement are 
always colored by the reality that, if the benefits are inadequate or outside pressures to file 
too strong, the debtor can always revert to a bankruptcy petition for relief. 
 123. See Becker, supra note 17, at 176 (“[A] common generalization by persons with 
judicial experience is that a change in the probability [of punishment] has a greater effect on 
the number of offenses than a change in the punishment.”); Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical 
Status of Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF 
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 367 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., Transaction Publishers 2006) 
(observing that crime and deviance are more accurately predicted by peer effects or self-
control than by deterrence variables but that, of all deterrence factors, certainty of 
punishment was the most influential in affecting behavior). 
 124. See discussion supra note 113. 
 125. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (observing that debtors may 
choose not to pursue a preference because the reputational cost may make doing so not 
worth the effort); Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[P]reference actions don’t 
really engender a lot of good will. . . . I mean it’s only a good idea if you really need 
the money.”). 
 
002.GOTBERG_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:38 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
594 
no chance for ongoing relationships;126 Chapter 7 trustees have a 
reputation for being more aggressive and active in pursuing 
preference actions than the average DIP.127 
In either chapter, trustees and DIPs are less inclined to bring 
preference actions in situations where the creditor may have a 
strong defense. This is consistent with regular notions of litigation 
strategy—the goal for both trustees and DIPs is to maximize the 
recovery for the debtor’s estate while minimizing the costs 
associated with that recovery. Accordingly, most preference 
proceedings begin with a letter-writing campaign in which the 
debtor’s representative will contact those who have received 
payments from the debtor in the previous ninety days with a 
demand to return such payments.128 Response to this letter-writing 
campaign will determine which complaints are actually filed. 
Creditors may respond to letters with the offer of a nuisance 
settlement, a blanket denial of any liability, or a demonstration of 
possible defenses. These responses, especially the demonstration of 
a strong defense, may prompt a trustee or DIP to abandon the 
preference claim altogether.129 
 
 126. Often, when preference actions are brought in a Chapter 11 case, it is in the context 
of a liquidation plan or a liquidating trust, put in place after the sale of the company has been 
successfully concluded. See discussion infra note 129 
 127. See Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns 
Corp.), 330 B.R. 364, 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“Debtors sometimes lack the inclination, or 
the means, to bring actions that should be prosecuted. They sometimes have higher 
priorities, or are distracted by other things. They sometimes have a practical need to avoid 
confrontation with entities like their secured lenders, because they need those entities’ 
continuing cooperation—as, for example, in connection with exit financing.”); Nancy Haller, 
Cybergenics II: Precedent and Policy vs. Plain Meaning, 56 ME. L. REV. 365, 384−85 (2004) (“A 
debtor-in-possession . . . may use the trustee provisions to favor certain creditors; may be 
unwilling to avoid transactions with a supplier or lender with whom it hopes to continue a 
business relationship after a successful reorganization; or may have developed friendships 
that make it difficult to choose to pursue actions with severe economic impacts.”). 
 128. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); Telephone Interview with DA 
(July 14, 2017) (“Mostly people look at preferences like, let me try and shake the tree to see if 
I can get some extra money.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“[Y]ou’re going 
to send at least a demand to see if he can shake the trees and get money out of them.”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017). 
 129. They may drop the claim both for efficiency reasons—it is likely to cost too much 
to pursue in light of the likely recovery—and for fear of repercussions if they continue to 
pursue what looks like a losing case. Courts have ruled that a trustee may be held liable for 
sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 for bringing a preference action without adequately 
investigating the availability of an affirmative defense. See In re Excello Press, Inc., 967 F.2d 
1109, 1112 (7th Cir. 1992) (ruling that at times a trustee may have a responsibility to examine 
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3. The strategic importance of a creditor 
For cases that proceed in Chapter 11, creditors may be in a 
position to influence whether and which preference claims are 
brought. Creditors are typically more involved in Chapter 11 cases 
than they are in Chapter 7 and have influence over the shape of the 
case. For example, in Chapter 11, creditors are able to vote in favor 
or against the debtor’s plan of reorganization.130 The U.S. Trustee 
may also appoint a creditor’s committee, which can employ its own 
counsel—paid from the estate’s administrative funds—to oversee 
the proceedings and petition the court for action when necessary.131 
A creditor’s committee might have different opinions regarding 
preference actions depending on the circumstances of the case. For 
example, the committee may be enthusiastic about the recovery of 
a significant preferential transfer from an insider or a secured 
creditor, but less enthusiastic about recovering a plethora of smaller 
preferential transfers from among its own membership—typically 
unsecured trade creditors. It is common for the committee to 
negotiate a provision in the plan of reorganization abandoning all 
preference claims, turning over all preference claims to the 
committee or to a liquidating trust, or otherwise adjusting how 
such claims will, or will not, be pursued.132 Individual creditors 
who have influence over the creditor’s committee are accordingly 
in a better place than others to influence whether, and against 
whom, preference actions are brought. 
Chapter 11 debtors may also be more selective than Chapter 7 
trustees regarding which preference actions, if any, they elect to 
 
whether any obvious affirmative defenses bar the case); Thomas D. Goldberg, Curbing 
Abusive Preference Actions: Rethinking Claims on Behalf of Administratively Insolvent Estates, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at *14, *17 (citing ethical reasons why a practitioner should not 
commence a preference action where there may be meritorious affirmative defenses). 
 130. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2012). 
 131. See id. §§ 1102–1103. 
 132. See, e.g., Moecker v. Johnson (In re Transit Group, Inc.), 332 B.R. 45, 53 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2005) (observing that the plan of reorganization assigned the debtor’s rights to prosecute 
avoidance actions to the creditors’ committee); see also Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 
8, 2017) (noting common practice of putting preference actions into a trust for the benefit of 
creditors); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (stating that these days preference 
actions are all brought by a liquidating trust); Telephone Interview with PC-B (Sept. 7, 2017) 
(“Whoever the creditors were, hired [a] collection company to shake down all the people 
[who] had been paid for services rendered within the ninety-day window.”). 
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pursue.133 Attorneys interviewed for this project were divided on 
whether the Bankruptcy Code sanctions this sort of selectivity. 
Most argued that the permissive language of the Code, indicating 
that the trustee or DIP “may avoid” preferential transfers, is 
deliberate, and permits a debtor to pursue or ignore preferences in 
keeping with its best interest in the long term.134 Others noted the 
duty of the debtor to maximize recovery for all creditors, and 
concluded the debtor is bound to pursue all preferences regardless 
of whether doing so may be bad for the debtor’s future business 
dealings.135 All agreed that preference actions are typically a low 
priority and tend to be pursued, if at all, after more pressing issues 
of estate administration have been settled. In many cases, 
preference actions are only brought after the plan has already been 
approved so as to minimize potential negative ramifications for the 
vote on the plan.136 
When the plan of reorganization involves selling the debtor as 
a going concern, the purchasing buyer may negotiate for any pref-
erence claims to be sold as part of the deal. However, the buyer will 
 
 133. The same permissive language would apply to Chapter 7 trustees who “may” 
avoid which preferences they prefer. However, Chapter 7 trustees are less likely than debtors 
to discriminate between creditors and more likely to examine potential preference actions 
solely on their merits, rather than evaluating the strategic value of a given creditor. This is 
true for the simple reason that a Chapter 7 trustee is unconcerned with a debtor’s ability to 
continue as a going concern and the need to do business with creditors going forward. Once 
the case is in Chapter 7, the decision to liquidate the business has already been made. Further, 
Chapter 7 trustees are compensated as a percentage of the dollar amount they bring into the 
estate and, accordingly, are personally incentivized to maximize the dollar return regardless 
of where the dollar comes from. See 11 U.S.C. § 326 (2012). 
 134. Id. § 547 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 
2017) (“I think it is a ‘may.’ I don’t think you are required to bring [preference actions] and I 
think the Bankruptcy Code allows for that decision-making process.”); Telephone Interview 
with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[I]t’s a permissive section you know; it says that they may bring 
them. So, I think that’s there for a real reason.”). 
 135. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“You really can’t do that, when 
you’re representing a Chapter 11 debtor. You’re a fiduciary of the debtor in possession.”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“I think you have to. I don’t think you’re doing 
your job if you don’t. . . . [Y]our debtor’s a fiduciary; they got to do what’s right.”). 
 136. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“[I]f it’s in a Chapter 11 you 
typically try to avoid doing those [preference actions] until after a plan’s confirmed or 
something. Because if you do that during the pendency of the case you’re going to not have 
a very happy creditor. They’re not going to be too terribly supportive of your reorganization 
efforts.”); Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017) (“[A] lot of times, people wait until 
after the plan is confirmed and then sometimes they’ll pursue those actions and sometimes 
not.”); discussion supra note 126. 
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generally decline to pursue such preferences, determining that 
their negative effects on business relationships will outweigh what-
ever income they may generate.137 This may be controversial for the 
creditor’s committee, particularly if the avoidance actions are some 
of the only remaining assets available to unsecured creditors.138 
Although trade creditors are generally very much in favor of 
restricting preference liability,139 there may be instances in which 
the recovery of a preference is their only recovery in bankruptcy. 
Ultimately, the enforcement of any given preference claim is 
highly uncertain and subject to a wide variety of factors, especially 
in Chapter 11 reorganization cases. The probability of preference 
liability for a creditor is negatively associated with the strategic 
importance of the creditor to the debtor’s business and stated 
defenses to liability. Accordingly, the probability of a preference 
action being raised decreases with the sophistication of a creditor, 
leading more sophisticated creditors to be less deterred from pre-
bankruptcy opt-out behavior.140 
 
 137. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“[W]e have seen in the sale 
of asset cases where buyers through their asset purchase agreements and then assuming the 
preference actions, essentially buying those actions from the bankruptcy estate, and out of 
the self-interest that they don’t want to, sue future customers as part of their acquisition.”); 
Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“Sometimes the buyer will buy those litigation 
claims and not ever pursue them because the buyer doesn’t want a liquidating trustee to sue 
them because they’re suppliers now.”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (“The 
buyer, I think the vast majority of the time, negotiates to protect vendors that they will 
continue to do business with.”). 
 138. For obvious reasons, the sale of a company tends to be for an amount sufficient to 
satisfy all secured creditors but not necessarily sufficient to satisfy the claims of unsecured 
creditors. When avoidance actions are granted to creditors’ committees instead, they may 
exercise discretion in whom the actions are brought against. See Telephone Interview with 
CA (June 21, 2017) (noting that committees prefer to bring preference actions against 
corporate insiders rather than one of their own trade creditors). 
 139. See Brave New World, supra note 43, at 439 (2005) (“[U]nless one’s ox got gored more 
than average, economic rationality might argue for accepting a pro-trustee venue system. 
That economic argument, though, is utterly unpersuasive to trade creditors—a truth to 
which I personally can attest as Reporter for the ABI Preference Study, where I tried in vain 
to make that argument to the trade creditor representatives.”); see also Examining Sect. 547, 
supra note 104. 
 140. The probability of a successful preference action, p, is a function of the probability 
of a bankruptcy filing within ninety days, pb; the strength of the creditor, including possible 
defenses and negotiating power, ps; and the amount of discretion exercised by the debtor in 
bringing preference actions, itself informed by chapter choice, pd. The amount a creditor 
expends on defense costs, c, may also influence the probability of a preference action by 
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B. Expected Liability 
Expected liability associated with preference actions is 
consistently lower than the expected benefit across all creditor 
types. The penalty associated with accepting a preferential transfer 
is limited to the avoidance of that transfer—in layman’s terms, the 
creditor must give back whatever it received from the debtor in 
exchange for a claim against the debtor’s estate. Assuming the 
creditor does not expend any additional, unrecoverable costs to 
collect or defend a preference, the worst-case scenario is a wash. 
From the creditor’s perspective, then, there are no actual risks 
associated with recovery during the preference period. As noted 
by Tabb: 
An economically rational creditor usually will decide to take a 
preference. The only sanction of the bankruptcy preference law is 
that the preferred creditor has to return the money paid, thereby 
returning to the status that it had before receipt of the preferential 
transfer. . . . [T]he only potentially lost costs are those associated 
with receiving the preference in the first place—for example, 
sheriff’s fees and attorneys [sic] fees—and with defending a 
preference lawsuit, if the creditor chooses to do so.141 
John McCoid has also observed that, due to the often-significant 
delay between receipt of a transfer and its recovery by the trustee, 
creditors may be better off even if they are required to return the 
full dollar amount of what they collected, due to the time value of 
money.142 And the penalty demanded by the trustee or the DIP is 
usually far less than the full amount of the preference, for the 
simple reason that the debtor would have to expend funds, time, 
and attention to obtain a judgment for the full amount of the 
preference recovery. Each of these three resources is at a premium 
 
strengthening the bargaining power or possible defenses of the creditor, represented by ps. 
Accordingly, p = p (pb, ps, pd). 
 141. Rethinking Preferences, supra note 71, at 991 (footnote omitted). 
 142. McCoid, supra note 35, at 264; see also E-mail from Paul Schrader, supra note 79 
(suggesting that the vast majority of creditors would prefer to have money now that they 
will need to repay over the possibility of a payment at the end of the bankruptcy case). It is 
worth noting that under English law, unlawful preferences may give rise to a claim of 
interest against the recipient, although there is some lack of clarity on when the interest 
should begin to accrue. See Adrian Walters, Preferences, in VULNERABLE TRANSACTIONS IN 
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 123 (John Armour & Howard Bennett eds., 2003). 
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in any bankruptcy case, whether in Chapter 7 or 11, opening the 
door to settlement between the parties even in cases of 
clear liability. One survey of practitioners estimated that the 
percentage of the claim settled for was, on average, 58.5%, with 
wide variation.143 
Much of the variation can be explained by the availability or 
absence of relevant defenses. Creditors who can predict a 
bankruptcy filing may adjust their behavior to better align with 
these defenses in the days leading up to a debtor’s bankruptcy, 
which can both weaken a debtor’s incentives to bring a preference 
action and strengthen a creditor’s ability to defend against it.144 
Even creditors who have failed to make adjustments in advance of 
a bankruptcy filing may, upon advice of counsel, make persuasive 
arguments that would encourage settlement rather than litigation 
of issues like the ordinary course exception. Between the 
advantages of advance planning and strong counsel, the creditors 
who pay the least in settlement, and are therefore the least deterred, 
are typically those with access to a debtor’s financials who have the 
ability to structure payments from the debtor in the days before 
bankruptcy and the resources to hire representation in the 
subsequent bankruptcy case. To the extent that preference is 
intended to deter “in-the-know” creditors from altering their 
 
 143. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53; see also E-mail from Paul Schrader, supra 
note 79 (on file with author) (“[T]he take of trustees and counsel from preference recoveries 
is often in the 20%–40% range.”); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“The only 
thing I guess I would say with certainty is less than half. I’ve seen as low as 10% or less I 
suppose, it was rare that it was more than 50%.”); Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 
2017) (“[A]s a rule of thumb, [the settlement] should be less than 10%.”); Telephone Interview 
with CA (June 6, 2017) (“In the practical scheme of things they’ll take 50 cents on the dollar 
back, 60 cents.”); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (reference to choking a $25,000 
claim to $10,000); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (pointing out that settlement 
payments of up to 75% are made on transfers with no defense, and up to 25% on transfers 
for which there is a good defense); Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) (stating that 
settlement amount ranges from 25 to 90% of the claimed amount); Telephone Interview with 
DA (July 17, 2017) (stating that preference claims are settled for 20% or less of the face value); 
Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (stating that settlements are 10 to 20% of what 
is owed); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“They always settle and they always 
settle for 40 to 60 cents [on the dollar].”). 
 144. McCoid, supra note 35, at 266 (noting that preference law operates to favor 
creditors with more inside information regarding the debtor’s financial situation over those 
who are less aware). 
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behavior in the days leading up to bankruptcy, it fails most where 
it is most needed.145 
C. Preference Deterrence Model 
As explained above, the function for deterrence in preference 
law is different than it is in the context of criminal law. At its core, 
however, the two analyses are similar. It might be stated that 
Ri = Ri (pi, li, ci), 
where R is a creditor’s expected recovery of past-due debt from 
the debtor following collection efforts, p is the probability of a 
preference action being successfully maintained against the 
creditor, l is the liability of the creditor, and c are associated costs, 
such as the fees of an attorney or creditor manager who oversees 
the collection account and negotiates with the debtor and the 
debtor’s estate. Expressed as a utility model, we might say that 
R = (1–p) r + p (r – (l + d)), 
where R is a creditor’s total expected recovery when p is the 
probability of a successful preference action, r is the amount 
transferred from debtor to the creditor during the preference 
period, l is the amount repaid to the debtor’s estate pursuant to the 
settlement agreement or judgment, and d represents costs 
associated with defending the preference action. In plain language, 
a creditor’s expected recovery is higher when p, l, and d, are lower, 
that is, when preference actions are less likely, and preference 
awards and associated costs are lower. 
We must then add to the utility model to account for the 
creditor’s entitlement to a claim against the estate on account of the 
amount avoided as a preference. The money returned by the 
creditor to the debtor pursuant to preference liability is, after all, 
rightfully due and owing, and the creditor is entitled to distribution  	  
 
 145. Bussel, supra note 73, at 14 (noting that preference law plays the necessary and 
important role of “controlling express opt-out behavior by in-the-know creditors, especially 
insider-creditors”). 
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on account of that claim in liquidation or according to a plan of 
reorganization. The new calculation becomes: 
R = (1–p) r + p (r – (l + d) + PR (l)). 
In this equation, PR signifies the pro rata percentage that an 
unsecured creditor can expect from the bankruptcy estate as part of 
the overall creditor recovery. 
Theoretically, a creditor would use this equation to weigh the 
expected returns of obtaining payment from the debtor when the 
debtor is insolvent against the expected returns of not seeking or 
accepting payment. Analysis of the equation quickly demonstrates 
that R is presumptively higher when a creditor collects than when 
a creditor does nothing. In fact, as creditors become more 
sophisticated, their expected return on collection over non-
collection grows. This means that sophisticated creditors are less 
likely to be deterred by preference liability, and therefore more 
likely to pursue preference payments from the debtor in the days 
leading up to bankruptcy. 
Collection is more profitable than failure to collect even if 
preference liability is a near-certainty, so long as the expected 
settlement payment and associated costs do not exceed the amount 
recovered from the debtor. 
If r > (l + d), then R > 0. 
In other words, so long as creditors are careful not to spend more 
defending against preference liability than they can reduce their 
overall liability through negotiation with the trustee or the DIP, 
they will be better off taking the risk. Accordingly, a first level 
approximation of creditors’ expected recovery indicates that 
sophisticated creditors who are efficient in their defense costs will 
always choose to accept or even demand payment from a debtor, 
however likely a resultant preference action may be. Of course, the 
less likely a preference action is, the higher the expected recovery. 
Creditors generally can control the costs of defending a prefer-
ence action. In addition, creditors will only need to incur such costs 
after bankruptcy has been filed. Accordingly, creditors may 
evaluate, based on factors informing the probability of a successful 
preference action and the likelihood of favorable settlement terms, 
how much to spend to maximize probable recovery. In cases where 
there is a low probability of defenses and low strategic power, the 
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creditor can expend little to nothing on a defense. In cases where 
the creditor is better able to exert influence or argue defenses, the 
creditor may expend more on costs to maximize recovery. Savvy 
creditors will not spend more than they expect to reduce their 
liability. In other words, creditors will ensure that 
d < r – l, 
 such that attempts to collect r will always result in a higher 
payout than doing nothing. 
Although creditors cannot control or even always predict when 
preference liability may happen, they can reduce the likelihood that 
liability will result in a net negative by ensuring that costs of 
defense do not exceed the expected reduction in liability. As a 
consequence, even though creditors despise being targeted for 
preference actions, they do not reduce their collection activities in 
the face of possible preference liability. Even creditors who face 
liability do not regret having collected in the first place. When 
asked what they might have done differently to avoid liability, the 
only proposed change they would make in their behavior moving 
forward is to be more cautious in lending to other debtors who may 
eventually find themselves in bankruptcy.146 
D. Empirical Findings 
Up to now, there has been a great deal of skepticism over the 
extent to which preference law is effective as a deterrent but little 
to no evidence establishing or refuting its effectiveness.147 
Information regarding the impact of preference law in the real 
world is notoriously difficult to obtain, in large part because so little 
of preference enforcement is in the court record. Many preference 
actions are settled before a complaint is even filed, leaving no 
 
 146. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017); Telephone Interview with 
PC-B (Sept. 7, 2017) (“[W]e’re more risk-averse than we were, so that means companies that 
need help don’t get as much of our expertise.”). The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 2005 
to include the value of goods received by the debtor in the twenty days before the bankruptcy 
filing as an administrative expense, in order to counteract the perceived reluctance to give 
even short-term credit to a company struggling with insolvency. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 503(b)(9) (2012). 
 147. See McCoid supra note 35, at 263 (“[T]estimony [that preference law is effective as 
deterrence] is generally either anecdotal or conclusory.”). 
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evidence of the preference at all other than a record of potentially 
preferential payments in a debtor’s initial disclosures.148 In some 
cases, debtors may state in their Chapter 11 plan disclosure 
documents that preference actions have been considered but will 
not be brought to trial, with no explanation as to whether they were 
simply dropped or pursued and settled.149 Previous efforts to study 
preferences have consistently run into this difficulty, and more 
empirical research on the topic is necessary.150 
My primary goal in the instant study was to understand the 
effect of preference law on creditor behavior. In conducting my 
interviews, the opinions and observations I heard largely echoed 
the findings of a previous study on preferences conducted by the 
American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Bankruptcy Reform Study 
Project in 1995–96. The ABI had formed a Task Force to study 
preference law in response to concerns voiced over the perceived 
unfairness of preference law. As part of its study, the Task Force 
prepared two surveys, one directed at creditor providers and the 
other at bankruptcy practitioners, to elicit information and opinions 
on preference law.151 Unsurprisingly, survey results indicated that 
credit providers were much more critical of preference law than 
practitioners, but both groups believed that preference laws 
penalized creditors who attempted to work with debtors by 
accepting settlements or workouts in the days prior to bank-
ruptcy.152 These findings suggest that the deterrent effect of prefer-
ence law has been turned on its head—rather than discouraging 
creditors from dismantling the debtor in the days leading up to 
bankruptcy, it discourages creditors from working with the debtor 
 
 148. As part of a debtor’s required schedules to be filed with the court, the debtor must 
provide a list of all transfers that have taken place within the previous ninety days. See U.S. 
COURTS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS FOR NON-INDIVIDUALS FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY: 
OFFICIAL FORM 207 (Apr. 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b_207.pdf. 
 149. See, e.g., Debtor’s Disclosure Statement at 17, In re Bermo Enterprises, Inc., Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. (2013) (No. 12-10207) (noting that debtor’s rights to avoidance actions are 
preserved, but releasing, without explanation, all avoidance claims except for a specified 
group); cf. Busick Insulated Glass, Inc.’s Second Amended Disclosure Statement for its 
Second Amended Plan of Reorganization at 7, In re Busick Insulated Glass, Inc., Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. (2013) (Doc. 142) (reporting settlement amount and decision not to pursue alternative 
actions in light of likely defenses). 
 150. Ponoroff, supra note 2, at 346, 356. 
 151. See ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53, at 2. 
 152. See id. at 2. 
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to avoid premature dismantling.153 My research sought to better 
understand how preference law impacts creditor behavior through 
in-depth interviews with individuals who had recently been part of 
a Chapter 11 case. 
In order to identify possible subjects, I used the Bloomberg Law 
search engine to pull public bankruptcy records for all Chapter 11 
cases with a confirmed plan that closed sometime between August 
30, 2010, and February 1, 2017. I limited my search to companies 
with assets and liabilities in the range of $1 million and $100 million 
that also listed unsecured trade creditors in their schedules. Within 
this sample, I looked for companies that had filed a preference 
action against a creditor, searching within court documents for any 
reference to § 547 (the Code section for preference avoidance).154 I 
excluded cases that ended in liquidation of the debtor’s assets, 
although I included cases where the company was sold as a going 
concern. For each of the cases within my sample, I identified the top 
twenty unsecured creditors, as listed by the debtor on Official 
Form 4. I further identified any additional creditors who were the 
subject of a preference lawsuit, as reflected in the court record. I 
excluded creditors located outside the United States, taxing entities, 
insiders, creditors subject to an action under § 544,155 and judg-
ment creditors.156 
 
 153. As much has been suggested by other scholars as well. See McCoid, supra note 35, 
at 261 n.78 (noting that preference may be given by the debtor to induce a creditor to come 
to the debtor’s assistance and facilitate rehabilitation, but possible avoidance of such a 
preference weakens the debtor’s ability to use it as an incentive); see also Denney v. Dana, 56 
Mass. (2 Cush.) 160, 171–72 (1848). 
 154. The Bankruptcy Code contains additional provisions that allow a trustee to sue 
creditors for similar causes. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the trustee to 
recover the amount offset by a creditor in the 90 days before bankruptcy on a preference-like 
analysis). However, I did not target these provisions for consideration in my study. 
 155. Creditors may be liable under 11 U.S.C. § 544 if they have not perfected their 
otherwise valid security interests prior to the bankruptcy filing. Pursuant to § 544 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee is afforded all the rights of a hypothetical lien 
creditor who obtained a judicial lien over all of the debtor’s property as of the 
commencement of the case. Pursuant to the rules of secured transactions, as reflected in UCC 
§ 9-317(a), the bankruptcy trustee would prevail over any secured creditor not perfected as 
of the date of filing. 
 156. The exclusion of judgment creditors was due primarily to my desire to focus on 
how bankruptcy filings and preference actions affected business relationships between 
debtors and creditors. When creditors were identified as judgment creditors, it appeared to 
distinguish them from creditors who were or had been engaged in ongoing business dealings 
with the debtor (“trade creditors”). 
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I mailed introductory letters to the remaining creditors, as well 
as to the debtor and all attorneys of record. I sent mailings one case 
at a time, beginning with the five most recent cases and then 
proceeding in alphabetical order until I had sent mailings to around 
350 individuals. A few weeks later, I attempted to call the 
individual creditors, debtors, and attorneys for whom I could locate 
telephone numbers.157 If I was successful in reaching an individual, 
I made the request to interview them for this study.158 In many 
cases, I left messages on voicemail or with an assistant. Where I left 
messages, I attempted a second phone call before abandoning 
the contact. 
Through these efforts, I was able to obtain complete interviews 
from forty-eight individuals, including twenty-eight creditors, 
three debtors,159 and seventeen attorneys.160 Of the creditors who 
consented to be interviewed, eleven had themselves been the 
subject of a preference action. Of the attorneys interviewed, all had 
experience with preferential transfers, albeit on different sides of 
the aisle and at different times. Ten of the attorneys represented the 
debtor in the case that was the subject of the study, and the 
remaining seven represented a creditor, although most of the 
attorneys represented a mix of debtors and creditors in bankruptcy 
cases over the scope of their careers.161 The size of the company with 
which individuals were associated varied widely. Some creditors 
interviewed were sole practitioners or “mom-and-pop” shops, 
while others were associated with large international organiza-
tions. The interviewees represented a diverse population geo-
graphically. They hailed from eighteen different states, including 
New York, Florida, and California, as well as Kansas, Michigan, 
 
 157. Some individuals responded to my letter with requests not to be contacted. For 
others, the introductory letter was returned as undeliverable. In these cases, I did not make 
further attempts to contact. 
 158. As per University protocol, I obtained advance approval for this study from the 
Institutional Review Board. Documentation on file with the author. 
 159. The ratio of debtor to creditor interviews largely reflects the overall ratio within 
cases. Obviously, each individual debtor had multiple creditors. 
 160. One attorney interviewed was referred by another study participant, based on his 
experience and familiarity with preference actions, and so was not contacted by virtue of his 
involvement in one of the sample cases. As explained below, because all attorneys spoke 
generally regarding their overall experiences rather than providing specifics for a given case, 
participation in a case within the sample was not essential. 
 161. Attorneys who agreed to a formal interview represented a combined 515 years of 
experience in insolvency proceedings. 
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and North Dakota. Interviews lasted anywhere from ten minutes to 
over an hour, with most falling in the range of fifteen- to twenty-
minute conversations. All interviews were conducted in a five-
month period, between May 18, 2017, and October 18, 2017. 
In preparing for and conducting these interviews, I was aware 
of the danger that, through my questions, I might impose my own 
views or suggest desired responses. Accordingly, I relied primarily 
on broad, open-ended questions, asking for more specific details 
only when I did not fully understand the responses given. 
Questions differed depending on the participant. For creditors and 
debtors, I asked for information specifically relating to the 
particular case in which they had been involved. For example, I 
asked the creditors whether they were surprised by the debtor’s 
decision to file for bankruptcy, how the debtor’s bankruptcy had 
affected their own business, and whether they were satisfied with 
the outcome of the bankruptcy. I asked debtors how they made the 
decision to file for bankruptcy and how they made the decision 
whether or not to bring a preference action against creditors. I 
asked attorneys for their general observations based on experiences 
across bankruptcy cases (in part to avoid concerns regarding 
confidentiality for any given case), whether creditors were likely to 
predict a preference action and whether, in their view, such a 
prediction deterred attempts to collect. 
Interview responses reflected a variety of experiences, which 
one would expect from a diverse group of individuals, but several 
common themes developed quickly and consistently from the 
collected statements of interviewees. First, debtors seem to bring 
preference actions only against those creditors who are less 
necessary for the debtor’s ongoing survival.162 In other words, 
debtors will target creditors who are less useful or less important to 
the debtor. Further, attorneys reported that it was extremely rare to 
see a preference action brought against any creditor during a “true” 
 
 162. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (filed preference actions either 
when significantly large or when the debtor “didn’t really care about the creditor anymore, 
didn’t need the creditor’s support”); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (noting 
that client subjected to preference action was a “sacrificial lamb” that the debtor no longer 
required); Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) (“There were [other] people who 
were given preferential treatment and they never got lawsuits against them at all.”). 
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Chapter 11 reorganization and that such claims were typically only 
exercised in Chapter 7 or in a Chapter 11 liquidation.163 As ex-
pressed by one debtor’s attorney, 
if you’re working with a client and he’s selling you something that 
you need and you have a good relationship with him, you’re not 
going to sue him to repay $50,000. Especially if your Plan’s been 
confirmed. . . . But, you do see it a lot in the liquidation cases.164 
When claims are brought in a Chapter 11 reorganization, they are 
typically brought at the end of the case by a third party, such as the 
head of a liquidating trust or the creditor’s committee.165 
Second, larger, more sophisticated creditors anticipate and 
respond to preference claims differently than smaller, less 
sophisticated creditors. Larger creditors frequently employ in-
house credit managers to monitor their lines of credit and 
payments.166 These creditors, by virtue of the monitoring and 
experience, are frequently able to confidently predict a possible 
 
 163. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (“[I]n my experience the trade 
creditors are being pursued by the Chapter 7 trustee, the liquidating trust trustee coming out 
of the bankruptcy so that there isn’t an ongoing Chapter 11 debtor that needs the relation-
ship, because he’s not going to pursue the preference action against a party that is needed 
for the business, if there is an ongoing business.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 
2017) (“I can’t think of a Chapter 11 that I have filed in the last five years where there was a 
lot of preference action.”). 
 164. Telephone Interview with DA (May 19, 2017); see also Telephone Interview with 
DA (May 25, 2017) (“[T]ypically, in a true reorganization as opposed to a sale case or a 
liquidation . . . you normally give up, waive, any right to bring preference actions as part-
and-parcel of your confirmation process.”). 
 165. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“[I]f preference actions are going 
to be pursued. . . [i]t’s not going to be by the debtor, it’s going to be by a third party . . . 
commonly a liquidating trust.”). This finding was somewhat inconsistent with the results of 
the 1997 survey distributed by the ABI, which suggested that preference litigation is—or 
was—fairly frequent, even in Chapter 11 cases pre-confirmation. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, 
supra note 53, at 7 (indicating that over 70% of practitioners said preference litigation was 
commenced sometimes or frequently in Chapter 7 and post-confirmation in Chapter 11, and 
over half responded in like fashion for Chapter 11 pre-confirmation). This inconsistency 
might be explained by the fact that the ABI survey did not distinguish between reorganizing 
and liquidating Chapter 11 cases in its question, and the fact that liquidating Chapter 11s 
have become increasingly common in the intervening decades. See Chad P. Pugatch et al., 
The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 61–63 (2008). 
 166. That said, size did not always signal sophistication. In at least one instance, a 
smaller employer with less than ten employees, nevertheless, hired a credit management 
company and obtained insurance to cover any loss in sales. Furthermore, this employer 
established payment terms that protected the creditor against the possibility of preference 
liability. See Telephone Interview with C-N (May 22, 2017). 
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bankruptcy filing.167 As noted by one creditor, “as a customer’s 
payment pattern slows down and their invoices are aging further 
and further and their explanations are weaker and weaker, it 
becomes kind of clear, in most instances, what is going on before 
they pull the trigger on the bankruptcy.”168 In addition, more 
sophisticated creditors are more likely to be aware of preference 
law, even if they do not register that any given payment will be a 
potential preference until after the bankruptcy filing.169 On the 
other hand, smaller creditors with fewer administrative staff were 
much more likely to report being surprised by the bankruptcy, even 
 
 167. See Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28, 2017) (“You tend to learn what happens 
when a customer is starting to have problems.”); Telephone Interview with C (June 7, 2017) 
(“Usually, when we start running into payment issues like this and it gets this far this 
quickly, then yeah, it’s not a big surprise.”); Telephone Interview with C (May 18, 2017) 
(“[A]nytime anybody files for bankruptcy . . . there’s always a pattern that we see. Kind of a 
payment pattern. It takes them longer to respond. It’s more of a payment history pattern that 
starts to change.”); Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (noting that trade creditors 
usually see the bankruptcy coming); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (“Oh, you 
can tell when a bankruptcy is coming.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) 
(“Oftentimes, it’s not a surprise because more sophisticated trade creditors can see the 
warning signs.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (“For my clients who tend to 
be sophisticated, it’s typically less of a surprise and no longer a traumatic or stigma or issue 
associated than it was . . . years ago, when I started.”); Telephone Interview with PC (July 14, 
2017) (“[W]hen someone is filing for bankruptcy we usually get some notice beforehand that 
we try to reduce the balance as quickly as possible.”); Telephone Interview with  PC (July 11, 
2017) (“[W]hen you start seeing a company that is rolling out farther and farther and farther 
on their payments, and the things that we have in place to monitor accounts, generally it’s 
not a huge surprise to us when it happens.”); Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017) 
(“Usually, our credit and collections manager is very good at predicting bankruptcies. Very 
good. We usually see them coming to be honest.”). 
 168. Telephone Interview with C-VK (June 6, 2017). 
 169. See Telephone Interview with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“The smaller trade creditors 
generally didn’t see it coming unless they had a lawyer.”); Telephone Interview with CA 
(June 21, 2017) (“If [creditors are] sophisticated, meaning they’ve been sued before, then they 
go ‘oops’ when they get the filing. . . . If they haven’t been sued before then sometimes the 
demand letter from the debtor or the liquidating trustee is the first they know about it.”); 
Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017) (indicating that creditors are “not thinking, ‘I 
have now gotten a preference action’ even though they may have a chief financial officer 
who certainly knows about preferences”); Telephone Interview with DA (Aug. 31, 2017) 
(“[A]ny savvy creditor would be sensitive to preferences . . . . [, b]ut I guess [mom-and-pop 
creditors], . . . they don’t have the same sophistication, or they haven’t been down that path 
before. You go down that path once, you’ll never be surprised by it again.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (“The sophisticated ones know what’s coming, and the 
ones that are less sophisticated or haven’t been through the process are often surprised by 
[preference claims].”); Telephone Interview with DA (May 25, 2017) (observing that 
sophisticated creditors “are very well aware of preference actions and the risk that they 
might be brought at some point either during or after the case”). 
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if they had noticed the debtor was behind on its payments.170 
Preference actions were especially shocking,171 particularly to 
creditors who had engaged in pre-filing negotiation and even 
settlement talks with a debtor to resolve the outstanding account.172 
The stories given by smaller creditors were telling. One creditor 
who headed a firm of less than fifteen employees reported that he 
had just established a payment plan with a debtor shortly before 
the debtor filed and was shocked, after the bankruptcy filing, to 
receive a demand for all of the money he had been paid under the 
negotiated payment plan. He observed that “big corporations . . . 
have figured out a way to protect themselves. Small guys like me, 
who take you on your word, have no protection.”173 Another 
creditor with a similarly sized firm reported that the debtor 
contacted the creditor in advance of the bankruptcy to assure that 
the creditor’s debt would be satisfied without the necessity of a 
mechanic’s lien (which may be exempt from preference 
litigation)174 to which the creditor would have been entitled. On 
account of the call, the creditor forbore from obtaining the lien only 
to receive a notice of the bankruptcy shortly after.175 A third 
creditor, with less than ten employees, reported being contacted by 
the debtor with an offer to settle for half the debtor’s outstanding 
balance of $20,000. The creditor accepted the offer “because I didn’t 
think this company would last,” and was astounded to receive a 
demand in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, not just for the settlement 
 
 170. See Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (“The big guys, you can usually 
see [the bankruptcy] coming. . . . With the smaller guys you wake up one morning and 
they’re out of business.”); Telephone Interview with C-E (May 22, 2017) (expressing surprise 
at the bankruptcy despite knowing the debtor was in trouble, but expecting the debtor to 
work it out); Telephone Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (“You’ve got to be a fairly big, a 
fairly good size vendor in order to have a collection department, that can anticipate a 
potential bankruptcy, and make changes in their way of doing business to avoid a preference 
action.”); Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) (noting surprise about the 
bankruptcy, especially since debtor was ordering product until the week prior); Telephone 
Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) (“I had no clue that that would ever happen.”). 
 171. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017). 
 172. See Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017). 
 173. Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017). 
 174. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6) (2012). 
 175. Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) (“A month later all of a sudden, we 
get a letter that we’re included in the bankruptcy and now he won’t take the owner’s 
phone calls.”). 
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amount but for additional amounts received previous to the 
settlement.176 “So, they sued for preferential payment. Like I said, 
we’re the small guy, we’re the last one to get paid. So, for us to get 
preference payment is ridiculous. . . . It was so bad. It was 
disgusting, you know?”177 The preference action was settled for less 
than half of the preference claim, but the owner maintained, “I still 
think it completely unfair.”178 Without a sophisticated under-
standing of the system, these creditors also felt that they were less 
successful in challenging or settling preference claims than larger 
or better informed creditors.179 Smaller creditors frequently 
reported feeling that they had been disadvantaged by a system of 
which they were largely ignorant and that other creditors were left 
significantly better off.180 Evidence suggests that these perceptions 
were not without basis.181 
The final, and perhaps most telling, observation across 
interviews was how creditors reacted to the threat of preference 
actions. Universally, creditors accepted—and even encouraged— 
payments from the debtor, even if they anticipated possible 
preference liability would follow.182 Further, they were advised by 
 
 176. Telephone Interview with PC (May 20, 2017). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Telephone Interview with PC (Aug. 31, 2017) (“I would have had to get a 
lawyer, go all the way up [to a different state for the hearing] . . . . [S]o now I’m paying a 
lawyer, taking time out of work; by the time I’m done I’m going to lose more than [what] 
they owed me. But I think that’s what [their goal was.]”); Telephone Interview with PC (June 
19, 2017) (“They’re just wringing everything they can out of you and they want to know your 
top dollar and to see how far they could get.”). 
 180. See Telephone Interview with PC (June 19, 2017) (“There were people who were 
given preferential treatment and they never got lawsuits against them at all. . . . Because they 
were actually given preferential treatment. We were not one of those people, just for 
the record.”). 
 181. See Telephone Interview with DA (July 14, 2017) (noting that the settlement 
amount “depends on the facts, of course, and it depends on how savvy the creditor is. . . . 
I’ve seen some creditors will just pay back money without getting into it—they don’t want 
to deal with the lawsuit.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“[T]ypically, 
smaller companies will want to negotiate something, say, ‘(1) we don’t want to spend much 
money on legal fees; (2) we can’t pay you anyway, so let’s cut a deal.’”). 
 182. See Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (“We wouldn’t back off on 
collection efforts. I might change their terms to COD . . . [and decline when the debtors] want 
you to apply it to the past due.”); Telephone Interview with PC (July 14, 2017) (“We just try 
to get as much cash as we can, as quickly as we can while we know somebody is going 
downhill. Or at the very least, our rule of thumb is, let’s at least freeze the balance so it doesn’t 
get any higher.”); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (explaining that, if an account 
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their attorneys to do exactly that, to “take the money and run[.] It’s 
always better to have the money in hand than not.”183 Literally 
every attorney responded to inquiries with similar advice: “[E]very 
creditor lawyer that you’ll talk to will say ‘take the money. We can 
always pay it back. Do not refuse money and take the money and 
we’ll deal with it on the backside under the statute.’”184 The shared 
perception was that creditors would still be better off taking the 
money even with a subsequent preference demand, since the 
trustee would invariably settle for a return of some portion—
perhaps half—of the preferential transfer.185 
Particularly for more sophisticated clients, this advice might be 
followed by the suggestion that a transaction be made as close to 
the ordinary course as possible, or otherwise positioned to fall into 
 
is starting to extend, the creditor reduces credit limit and sends representatives over to collect 
in person); see also Telephone Interview with CA (June 21, 2017) (“[I]f . . . they see a 
bankruptcy coming” they think, “‘we better start getting paid on our invoices timely.’”); 
Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017) (“[S]ome creditors take the approach of ‘I’d 
rather have the money and we can fight over it later’ and put pressure on to get payment if 
they see a bankruptcy coming.”). 
 183. Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017). 
 184. Telephone Interview with CA (May 25, 2017); see also, e.g., Telephone Interview 
with CA (Aug. 8, 2017) (“[I]f you can extract some payments . . . if you have the negotiating 
leverage to get that, get it.”); Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“I think the rule 
is: take the money and run. Do whatever you can to limit your preference risks, but having 
said that . . . . [t]ake the payment and deal with the preference risk another day, which may 
be two years from that day.”); Telephone Interview with DA (Sept. 8, 2017) (“[I]f they’re 
going to pay you—take the money. I always tell clients, take the money. You may have 
preference exposure, but take the money for now and we’ll see what happens.”); Telephone 
Interview with DA (July 17, 2017) (“It’s always wise for the creditor to take a preference. . . . 
Because if you can get the money, you can defend it later.”); Telephone Interview with DA 
(July 14, 2017) (“If your choice is either take the money now or not get money before a case, 
you take the money now.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 23, 2017) (“I think 
everybody would give the same advice. Take the money. Take the money. Take the money. 
Worry about it later.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 19, 2017) (“Always take it. . . . 
Always better to take and have to give back than never take it at all.”); Telephone Interview 
with DA (May 25, 2017) (“[T]he worst you’re going to have to do is give the money back, but 
take the money.”). 
 185. See Telephone Interview with C-BC (July 14, 2017) (“Say if you’re sued for a ten-
million-dollar preference claim, you . . . can settle for a hundred thousand if you have your 
ducks in a row.”); Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (“[Y]ou may have to give back 
fifty, sixty, seventy cents of it. But you’ll get something on it.”); Telephone Interview with 
CA (June 6, 2017) (“[Y]ou always take a preference. . . . [Y]ou’re going to have to give back 
part of it. Preferences, in the practical scheme of things, they’ll take fifty cents on the dollar 
back, sixty cents.”); Telephone Interview with DA (June 6, 2017) (“They always settle, and 
they always settle for 40 to 60 cents.”). 
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one of the preference law defenses.186 Several creditors discussed 
the possibility of attempting to convert outstanding amounts owed 
as accounts receivable into a new note for repayment in the 
ordinary course, or otherwise shielding the old debt with newly 
secured debt.187 Structuring payments through a third party, such 
as a credit card company, was also discussed as a possible response 
to guard against the threat of preference actions.188 Another tactic 
used was to enter into an agreement with the debtor that, in 
exchange for a reduced settlement of the amount owed, the debtor 
would commit to not file bankruptcy for ninety-one days after 
receipt of payment.189 Although some of these tactics seemed more 
likely to succeed than others, they all represented at least an 
awareness and intent to preempt preference liability. 
Perhaps the most common response when creditors anticipated 
a bankruptcy filing was to simply stop extending credit to the 
debtor and proceed on a cash basis going forward.190 This tended 
to be the approach of all creditors interviewed who had recently 
experienced preference liability for the first time. Being previously 
unaware of such a possibility, they responded going forward by 
restricting terms on all their debtors, whether it appeared they 
 
 186. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017); Telephone Interview with DA 
(July 14, 2017) (taking the preference, “you may be able to have ways to arrange for your 
payment in a way that doesn’t expose you to preference”); Telephone Interview with DA 
(June 20, 2017) (“Some will try to manipulate the allocation of the payment, to try and get it 
outside of preference wording.”). 
 187. See Telephone Interview with CA (June 6, 2017) (“Sure, they’re ways to get around 
it. I mean, you can advance them new money and take a security interest and incorporate 
that debt into the new money.”); Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017). 
 188. See Telephone Interview with CA (July 26, 2017) (“Do they try to move the 
payment form from a paper check to a credit card, or change the party paying the past due 
invoices? And can we get a third party in the form of a customer’s lender to buy the invoices 
perhaps at a discount that still take out the problem of the preference risk[?]”); Telephone 
Interview with CA (May 18, 2017) (“[Y]ou may even . . . see if there’s a way to structure 
payments from a non-bankruptcy entity, so to speak.”). 
 189. In the event of breach, the full amount of the debt would be reinstated as a claim 
against the estate. See Telephone Interview with DA (June 20, 2017). 
 190. See Telephone Interview with C (Aug. 28, 2017) (“[Y]ou can stop shipping them on 
terms and make them pay in advance for their orders or not ship them at all.”); Telephone 
Interview with C (June 7, 2017); Telephone Interview with C-B (July 14, 2017) (“[W]e actually 
ask for money upfront before we send the merchandise out.”); Telephone Interview with PC 
(July 14, 2017) (“We usually do it by trying to tighten up the payment plan. In other words, 
all credit terms stop.”); Telephone Interview with PC (July 11, 2017) (“[I]f they’re not paying 
they go on cash/check/credit card.”).  
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would file for bankruptcy or not.191 Creditors might also be quicker 
to act on legal rights in future cases to outrun other creditors or 
collect before the ninety-day period would run.192 Obviously, these 
responses are inconsistent with the stated deterrent intent of 
preference law, which was to provide the debtor with greater 
breathing space and avoid pressuring the debtor into a bankruptcy 
filing. The threat of preference actions does not discourage 
creditors from accepting and even encouraging cash payments. 
Instead, it encourages creditors to insist on strictly cash moving 
forward, and to tighten up lending terms with debtors they believe 
are a risk. This constraint on a debtor’s liquidity can only contribute 
to, not deter, a bankruptcy filing. 
VI. PROPOSED ADJUSTMENTS 
If the purpose of preference law is to discourage only “unusual” 
collection efforts that demonstrate “opt-out behavior,”193 it fails, in 
large part because it does not target such behavior. Instead, it casts 
a sweeping net that allows savvy creditors to escape its grasp and 
leaves less-savvy creditors to take the hit. If the purpose of 
preference law were instead to discourage all creditor collection in 
the days leading up to bankruptcy by virtue of a shotgun approach, 
it still fails, because the risks of being the target of a preference 
action combined with the expected penalty associated with 
preference liability, do not outweigh the benefits of collection. 
It is possible that, despite its failure on such stated goals, 
preference law is nevertheless defensible as a deterrent to 
 
 191. See Telephone Interview with PC (May 20, 2017) (cut next struggling debtor off 
months ahead of the eventual bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with PC (May 22, 2017) 
(“So, it makes you wonder, as you go for in business, is what it does. It makes you tighten 
up all of your financial aid to people, which makes it hard for these other businesses because 
you won’t extend them as much credit. But you just can’t afford to take these risks anymore. 
I got most everybody is on a cash basis. You want it, you pay me and you get it . . . . Nobody’s 
ever owed me that much money again. . . . You just lock them into thirty days, and if they 
don’t you just cut them off. It’s just not worth the risk.”). 
 192. See Telephone Interview with C-R (May 22, 2017) (“If we get that sort of a vibe 
we’re much quicker to go after a mechanic’s lien or we’ve taken several customers to court 
to go ahead and get claims against them and judgments before any of this happens.”); 
Telephone Interview with PC (June 1, 2017) (“We’re definitely more aggressive in our 
collection efforts.”). 
 193. See Afilalo, supra note 44, at 635; Bussel, supra note 73, at 14. 
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bankruptcy itself. If creditors are aware that preference liability 
only operates within bankruptcy,194 they may discourage the 
debtor from filing in whatever way they can, perhaps by 
conditioning negotiations or settlement on the debtor staying out 
of bankruptcy. In this way, the law of preferences may operate as a 
sort of bankruptcy tax on unsecured creditors. 
Alternatively, preference law may operate as a deterrent to 
unsecured credit. As described above, fully secured creditors are 
immune from preference liability, even though they are the most 
able creditors to push a debtor into bankruptcy by threatening or 
effectuating collection. Preference law may be viewed as 
encouraging more lending arrangements on a secured basis. Of 
course, this does nothing to answer the demands of involuntary 
creditors, such as tort victims, who typically lack the ability or the 
luxury to obtain security. To the extent unsecured credit is not 
deterred, preference law may operate to encourage greater 
monitoring of debtors, necessitate the retaining of counsel in bank-
ruptcy, and require creditors to take other precautions regarding 
unsecured debt. 
To be sure, none of these benefits were addressed by Congress 
in the passage of preference law, although it is at least theoretically 
possible that lawmakers could or would view them as desirable 
goals and consistent with an overarching trend in favor of secured 
credit to the detriment of unsecured credit. Nevertheless, 
preference law is a clumsy tool to accomplish these benefits, as 
demonstrated by the weaknesses outlined above, and likely 
unnecessary in light of strong state support for secured credit. If 
Congress wishes instead to use preference law to avoid the 
premature dismantling of companies or raiding of assets by 
favored creditors, I would recommend a tailoring and narrowing 
of preference law to more carefully target actors with the ability to 
harm debtors in this way, and then to increase the penalty 
associated with the harmful behavior. 
 
 194. See Skeel, supra note 119, at 492–93 (observing the inconsistency in preference law 
between state and federal law). 
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A. Discrimination Between Creditors 
In practice, preference law distinguishes between creditors 
based on their value to the debtor and their level of sophistication 
about the law, rather than engagement in behavior Congress 
thought to be harmful.195 To be effective, laws seeking to deter 
creditors from particular behavior must effectively single out 
individuals engaged in that behavior and not punish behavior that 
was not intended to be targeted. Accordingly, to make preference 
law a viable means of deterrence, I would only impose liability on 
those who have the leverage needed to “push” a debtor into 
bankruptcy or, in the case of insiders, gut the company during 
its slide. 
1. Insiders 
Even among those predisposed to dislike preference law, there 
is a general sense that it is appropriate to reclaim transfers made to 
insiders in the days leading up to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing.196 In 
some ways, this is a principle of fairness—the insiders are usually 
the parties viewed as most capable of preventing a bankruptcy and, 
if they have failed to do so, they should pay the consequences for 
the failure along with other creditors. Under this view, it is 
inherently unfair that insiders should receive payment on their 
debts while the debtor has creditors who are left unsatisfied.197 
There is also the concern of deterrence against fraudulent 
activities. Insiders typically determine which creditor to pay first. 
Insiders also typically have the best information regarding financial 
distress within a company and may therefore have both the 
incentive and the opportunity to bleed a company of its assets 
ahead of other creditors. To the extent this activity is fraudulent, it 
could be targeted and reversed pursuant to the avoidance of 
fraudulent transfers,198 however, fraud may be difficult to prove. In 
 
 195. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 196. As defined by the Bankruptcy Code, insiders include relatives or general partners 
of the debtor, directors, control persons, and others in similar positions. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(31) (2012). 
 197. See Telephone Interview with PC (Sept. 14, 2017) (“I was just the business; I was 
just selling product. There was no relationship there; there’s no family member, 
no nothing.”). 
 198. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012). 
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light of this, the return of payments made to insiders during a given 
period—preference law places it at one year prior to the 
bankruptcy—is likely appropriate. In order to be a deterrent, lia-
bility should exceed the value of the preferential transfer. 
The primary concern with allowing increased liability against 
insiders is that insiders who have received preferential payments 
might hesitate to file for bankruptcy on behalf of their company or 
might wait and file at a time that is less likely to expose insiders to 
liability, but also less likely to result in a successful reorganization. 
Such a disincentive operates under the current bankruptcy law, 
although it is unclear the extent to which it affects the decision to 
file for bankruptcy.199 However, states impose liability on transfers 
made to an insider while the debtor was insolvent pursuant to 
prohibitions on fraudulent conveyance.200 Accordingly, insiders 
would have reason to anticipate a demand for transfer in any case. 
2. Undersecured creditors 
Creditors who have a security interest associated with their 
outstanding debt, but who are owed more than the value of their 
collateral, are commonly referred to as “undersecured” creditors. 
Outside of bankruptcy, the undersecured status has relatively little 
significance, other than the fact that the creditor is likely to be left 
with a deficiency even after foreclosing on collateral. Within 
bankruptcy, however, an undersecured creditor’s claim is 
bifurcated into a secured and unsecured portion, leading to some 
increased complexity regarding the treatment of that claim. 
Undersecured creditors retain a claim against their collateral, but 
also hold an unsecured claim that will be paid out on a pro rata 
basis with other unsecured creditors. Although fully secured 
creditors are not subject to preference liability, undersecured 
creditors may be if a transfer from the debtor reduces the unsecured 
portion of their claim against the bankruptcy estate. 
From the perspective of deterrence, any creditor with a security 
interest in a debtor’s collateral, whether or not the debt is fully 
 
 199. See Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic Griffin, Facilitating Successful Failures, 66 
FLA. L. REV. 205, 223 (2014) (discussing other heuristics and biases influencing management’s 
decision to file for bankruptcy or not). 
 200. See Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) § 4(b)(1). This model act has been 
enacted in forty-three states. 
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secured, is more likely to have the leverage necessary to “push” a 
debtor into bankruptcy and is therefore a worthier target of laws 
that would discourage the creditor from taking steps to foreclose. 
Foreclosure—the seizure and sale of debtor property—certainly 
constitutes an action outside the ordinary course of business, and 
one that is very likely to have a negative impact on the debtor’s 
ability to function. Further, foreclosure is a value-destroying 
process, where collateral may be sold for a small fraction of its true 
worth. Accordingly, as far as collection practices go, creditors with 
the power to foreclose against a debtor’s property should be high 
on the list of those Congress would wish to deter, to better 
encourage successful reorganizations. 
It is perhaps ironic, then, that secured creditors generally are 
not subject to the deterrent force of preference law. Foreclosures of 
property in full satisfaction of a creditor’s debt will be upheld if 
they are completed prior to a bankruptcy filing. However, to the 
extent a creditor receives payments from the debtor that would 
reduce the unsecured portion of a creditor’s debt, such payments 
should be subject to deterrence through preference liability. An 
undersecured creditor is at once secured and unsecured but should 
not be permitted to exert the force of its security interest against the 
unsecured portion of its debt. Payments to an undersecured 
creditor in the run up to bankruptcy are presumably made in 
preference to other debts in order to avoid foreclosure. 
Undersecured creditors should be deterred from forcing such 
payments by relying on their secured status and should therefore 
be subject to preference liability if their unsecured debts are 
reduced via a transfer from the debtor in the ninety days prior 
to bankruptcy.201 
3. Tardily secured creditors who use security to coerce or foreclose 
A similar analysis applies to creditors who hold outstanding 
unsecured debt and then receive a security interest within the 
preference period, transforming them from unsecured to secured 
creditors at a time when the debtor is presumed to be insolvent. By 
 
 201. Creditors who are technically fully secured at the time of bankruptcy on account 
of payments made to reduce unsecured debt within the preference period but who otherwise 
would have been undersecured should also be subject to preference liability for the 
same reasons. 
002.GOTBERG_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:38 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
618 
virtue of obtaining a security interest, such creditors have estab-
lished a higher degree of leverage over a debtor, including a more 
realistic ability to force the debtor into bankruptcy proceedings. To 
the extent preference law is concerned with the exercise of such 
leverage it should permit a debtor to strip security interests granted 
or perfected in the ninety days before bankruptcy. The reason for 
treating perfection as an act of transfer is explained in the different 
treatment given to perfected and unperfected liens. Unperfected 
liens will not stand up to competing claims, including those raised 
by a bankruptcy trustee.202 Unperfected security interests, or “secret 
liens,” should be discouraged to avoid allowing creditors to force 
last minute pre-bankruptcy concessions from the debtor.203 
Like other secured creditors, even tardily secured (or perfected) 
creditors have the power to foreclose against the debtor’s property, 
which is the leverage needed to force a debtor into liquidation 
proceedings or undermine reorganization efforts. However, late-
perfected creditors only obtain this power (presuming insolvency 
in the ninety days before bankruptcy) after the debtor becomes 
unable to pay his or her debts as they come due. To the extent 
Congress wants to discourage actions that torpedo a debtor’s 
chances for survival during a period of insolvency, the act of obtain-
ing such leverage clearly qualifies. 
4. Judgment creditors 
The congressional record, with its specific reference to a “rac[e] 
to the courthouse,”204 appears to signal that judgment creditors 
were intended to be targeted and deterred by preference law. 
Discouraging judgment creditors from obtaining or executing a 
judgment on the eve of bankruptcy can be justified by the pressure 
such judgments place on the debtor, especially by locking up 
essential collateral. In addition, such judgments can be seen as 
 
 202. See discussion supra note 155 (regarding a trustee’s strong-arm powers pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 544). 
 203. See Brave New World supra note 43, at 445, 449 (suggesting that secret liens may be 
deliberate, and that the thirty-day rule in § 547(e)(2)(A) “empowers unperfected secured 
creditors to get more than they could have under state law and allows them to make pre-
bankruptcy grabs”). 
 204. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 177−78 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138. 
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incompatible with principles of judicial economy. Obtaining and 
executing on a judgment on the eve of bankruptcy is, in retrospect, 
wasted effort because the creation of the bankruptcy estate itself 
ensures that all claims will be acknowledged, whether or not they 
are reduced to judgment,205 and that the estate will be managed and 
liquidated in an orderly fashion, overseen by the bankruptcy court. 
Preference law can discourage a creditor from forcing the dupli-
cation of judicial effort by ensuring that a judicial ruling on a claim 
against a debtor will provide the creditor no advantage. Rational 
creditors will not take on the costs associated with obtaining and 
enforcing a judgment if those costs will leave them no better off in 
the end. 
Recognizing this argument, I am nevertheless troubled by the 
fact that preference law’s deterrent effect on obtaining judgments 
against insolvent debtors runs directly counter to state statutes of 
limitations encouraging creditors to exercise their rights against 
debtors in a timely fashion. In addition, the application of 
preference law to a judicial lien has been specifically objected to by 
credit providers, suggesting that many view this provision as 
particularly unfair.206 Perhaps the perceived unfairness comes from 
the fact that the creditors have rightfully invoked the power of the 
state, and would be reasonable in assuming that power to be 
paramount; in fact, the judgment lien can be undone by bankruptcy 
law. Perhaps the sense of unfairness arises because the creditors 
who often take advantage of the courts do so because they have no 
other means of leverage or influence over the debtor and may in 
fact be tort victims with no other means of collection. It may be that 
congressional efforts to discourage a race to the courthouse are 
inappropriate when a creditor has no alternative path, but the 
legislative history on preference law currently makes no allowance 
for such a distinction. 
5. Disproportionately large transfers 
Finally, preference law should claw back the transfer of a 
disproportionate portion of the debtor’s assets to satisfy a pre-
existing, unsecured debt, particularly in cases where the debtor is 
 
 205. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5), 502(a) (2012). 
 206. ABI PREFERENCE SURVEY, supra note 53, at 15. 
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left unable to operate as a consequence. Giving up significant 
amounts of the debtor’s operating cash is likely to leave the debtor 
vulnerable to liquidation and unable to successfully reorganize, 
perhaps just as effectively as would foreclosing on essential 
collateral. Accordingly, such behavior should be targeted and 
deterred.207 The appropriate threshold for how large a cash transfer 
must be to invoke liability is likely to be a fact-specific inquiry, 
depending on the size of the debtor and the nature of the debtor’s 
business. For ease of enforcement, the law may incorporate a 
standard comparing the size of the transfer to the debtor’s overall 
liquid assets, or something similar. Such a standard would be more 
effective in targeting behavior than simply establishing a minimum 
dollar amount.208 
In establishing liability for these transfers, preference law could 
both support and be supported by provisions that allow for the 
avoidance of fraudulent conveyances in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy 
trustees are permitted to avoid transfers made by the debtor with 
“actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” a creditor, or transfers 
for which the debtor received “less than a reasonably equivalent 
value” in exchange.209 This ability arises both under the Bankruptcy 
Code, and by virtue of the trustee’s ability to exercise the rights of 
any creditor under state law and raise state law causes of action to 
avoid fraudulent conveyances, which may have a longer lookback 
period.210 However, the burden of proof for fraudulent convey-
ances is much higher than for preferential transfers,211 and it is often 
easier and less time consuming for a trustee to simply bring a 
preference action, if the transfer is within the relevant period. 
 
 207. It is worth noting that other areas of the Bankruptcy Code deal with a creditor’s 
exercise of setoff rights, which frequently affect a debtor’s operating capital. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b). I would leave these provisions largely untouched. 
 208. See Bussel, supra note 73, at 12. 
 209. 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
 210. Id. § 544. 
 211. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547, with § 548. Fraudulent conveyance law typically requires 
a finding of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud, which need not be present in 
preference actions. 
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B. Impose a Deterrent Penalty 
Once liability has been limited to the parties listed above, that 
is, insiders, partially or recently secured creditors, judgment 
creditors, and recipients of a substantial portion of the debtor’s 
assets in the days leading up to bankruptcy, the law is better able 
to justify imposing a true deterrent effect. The justification for 
avoiding transfers to these individuals is more concrete, and the 
offending behavior more specific. Accordingly, the individuals can 
be expected to anticipate, and thereby avoid, a transfer that would 
violate the law.212 However, avoidance will only be rational if the 
probability of liability combined with the severity of punishment 
work together to outweigh the benefit of the targeted behavior. 
Under current preference law, creditors remain undeterred because 
the costs of liability systematically fall below the benefit of 
collection, regardless of how certain liability may be. 
To further increase the deterrent effect of the law, I would 
therefore recommend attaching a penalty to preference liability 
beyond simply returning the original transfer. McCoid has 
previously recommended that increasing the sanction to “two or 
three times the amount of the preference” would undoubtedly have 
a more deterrent effect on creditors subject to liability,213 although 
the exact percentage, fine, or additional punishment needed to 
effectively deter targeted behavior may be much less than that. 
As a caveat, I make this recommendation solely on the basis of 
the theoretical framework laid out by Becker, not based on my 
findings in the fields. By limiting myself to interviewing trade 
creditors, I did not obtain first-hand information as to whether the 
individuals I would target for preference liability are currently 
deterred, even without an associated penalty. It is conceivably 
possible that partially secured creditors are already discouraged 
from accepting payments from an insolvent debtor to reduce the 
amount of their unsecured debt potential or that secret lien holders, 
as a group, do not attempt to perfect a pre-existing security interest 
of an insolvent debtor. It may be that judgment creditors are 
 
 212. The risk that the law be seen as simply part of a broader Communist plot is 
therefore ameliorated. See Telephone Interview with CA (May 30, 2017) (explaining the 
difficulty of explaining the preference law to clients). 
 213. McCoid, supra note 35, at 270. 
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already discouraged from bringing suit against an insolvent debtor 
on the rationale that the effort will be largely wasted as a 
consequence of the debtor’s immediate bankruptcy filing, even if 
they are successful in obtaining a judgment and a subsequent lien. 
It would be extraordinarily difficult, as an empirical matter, to 
identify any of these individuals, for example, potential judgment 
creditors who could have “raced to the courthouse” against a 
debtor but opted not to on account of preference law. It is highly 
possible that they do exist and that imposition of an additional 
penalty on them, and on such creditors as a group, is wholly 
unnecessary. Additional empirical evidence may be needed to shed 
further light on the subject. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I have elsewhere argued that the current legal scheme 
undermines the first of preference goals—equality—and here I 
have shown how the law, as currently written, is wholly inadequate 
to serve the second of preference goals—deterrence. This is true 
even assuming (but not conceding) that deterrence of otherwise 
legal actions is possible through bankruptcy law, and that deterring 
the exercise of rights that disadvantage the debtor is desirable. 
In order to be an effective deterrent, the law must first target 
those actors and actions it seeks to discourage. Currently, it targets 
creditors whether or not they have engaged in behavior worthy of 
deterrence, imposing costs and nurturing a sense of unfairness and 
resentment towards the system. Further, the law must impose an 
actual punishment on targeted creditors if it wishes to deter 
behavior that, by virtue of being punishable only in bankruptcy, is 
only marginally likely to create a basis for liability. I have here laid 
out one proposal for improving preference law’s deterrent effect, 
although I refrain from passing judgment on whether such 
deterrence is actually desirable from a policy perspective. Such a 
question is worthy of additional evaluation.  
 
